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The Liability of Online Markets for 
Counterfeit Goods:  A Comparative 
Analysis of Secondary Trademark 
Infringement in the United States and 
Europe 
Kurt M. Saunders* 
Gerlinde Berger-Walliser** 
Abstract: Online trademark infringement and counterfeiting is a growing 
problem for luxury brands.  In recent years, trademark owners have taken aim 
at the operators of online marketplaces and auction websites, asserting that 
these defendants are liable for contributory infringement due to sales of 
counterfeit goods on their sites.  In addressing the scope of secondary liability 
for trademark infringement, the courts of the United States and European 
nations, including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, have applied 
differing standards and reached inconsistent results.  This article considers the 
question of secondary liability for trademark infringement from a comparative 
perspective and contrasts the rationales offered by the various courts in their 
decisions.  It argues for a harmonization of the law across borders that also fits 
the realities of the online intermediary market business model, and proposes a 
standard for doing so. 
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“[A merchant’s] . . . mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for 
the goods which bear it; it carries his name for good or ill.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A luxury brand’s most valuable asset is often its trademark, which 
signifies the status, quality, and price of the brand’s goods.  Although they 
may look the same as luxury goods, many counterfeit “knock-offs” of 
luxury goods are shoddily made.  The materials used may be of poor 
quality, and the high standards of manufacture and assembly on which 
luxury brands pride themselves are lacking.  Counterfeiting amounts to 
free-riding on the goodwill and reputation for quality associated with the 
brand’s trademark.  In the end, counterfeiting is damaging to a brand’s 
status in the luxury market because unknowing consumers may conclude 
that the knock-offs are genuine and that all items made by the actual luxury 
brand are inferior or not worth the upscale price. 
The incidence of counterfeiting and trademark infringement has surged 
with the widespread use of online marketplaces such as eBay, the Internet 
auction platform.  As a result, such sites have faced a steady stream of 
lawsuits brought by prominent trademark owners in United States and 
European courts in connection with the sale of counterfeit merchandise.2  
Famous luxury brands, such as Tiffany, Louis Vuitton, L’Oréal, Hermès, 
and Rolex, have argued that eBay and other online market operators and 
service providers are liable for the sale of counterfeit products by their 
users.  In these cases, the courts have had to address the critical issue of 
what level of knowledge is necessary to impose contributory liability on 
these intermediaries for sales by their users of infringing and counterfeit 
merchandise. 
Despite the best efforts of luxury brand owners to police their marks in 
the courts, counterfeiters continue to find new avenues to sell knock-off 
goods online.3  To complicate matters further, the courts in the U.S. and 
Europe have been divided on the issue, offering divergent approaches to the 
scope of secondary trademark infringement liability.  The possibility that an 
online market’s liability may now depend on where an action is brought is 
 
1 Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973 (2d Cir. 1928). 
2 See infra notes 52–67, 79–89, 111–113, 195–239, 264–281, and accompanying text. 
3 See Maura Kutner, The Fight Against Fakes Online, HARPER’S BAZAAR (Dec. 14, 
2010), http://www.harpersbazaar.com/fashion/fashion-articles/fight-against-fakes-online-
0111. 
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the focus of this article.  We begin by analyzing the current state of U.S. 
trademark law on the secondary liability of online markets for the sale of 
counterfeit goods.  We then go on to compare U.S. law to the law of the 
European Union as well as the domestic laws of several European countries 
where courts have addressed the issue. 
Thus, we start with the recent decision in Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay, 
Inc.,4 the first U.S. case that addressed the secondary liability of an online 
market.  In Tiffany v. eBay, the court dismissed all claims against eBay, 
reasoning that “it is the trademark owner’s burden to police its mark, and 
companies like eBay cannot be held liable for trademark infringement based 
solely on their generalized knowledge that trademark infringement might be 
occurring on their websites.”5 
In contrast to the ruling in Tiffany v. eBay, the outcomes in similar 
cases brought by trademark owners in the courts of various European 
countries have been mixed.  While a Belgian court reached a decision in the 
case of Lancôme Parfums et Beaute & Cie v. eBay International AG6 that is 
in accordance with the U.S. decision in Tiffany v. eBay, most French courts 
have taken a contrary view and ordered eBay to pay—for European 
standards—substantial damages jointly with the seller of the product,7 while 
other French courts have exempted eBay from liability,8 because of the 
company’s special status as a host provider according to the EU E-
Commerce Directive.9  In three decisions, Internet-Versteigerung I–III 
 
4 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 
2010) (affirming the district court’s holding as to the trademark infringement claims). 
5 Id. at 527. 
6 Tribunal de Commerce [Comm.] [Commerce Tribunal] Bruxelles, July 31, 2008, 
REVUE LAMY DROIT DE L’IMMATERIEL [RLDI] 2008, 41 (Belg.). 
7 See, e.g., Tribunal de commerce [TC] [commercial court] Paris, 1e ch. B, June 30, 
2008, no. 2006077799 (Fr.), available at http://www.foruminternet.org/specialistes/veille-
juridique/jurisprudence/IMG/pdf/tcom-par20080630.pdf; Tribunal de commerce [TC] 
[commercial court] Paris, 1e ch. B, June 30, 2008, no. 2006077807 (Fr.), available at 
http://www.juriscom.net/documents/resp20080630-Diorc.pdf; Tribunal de commerce [TC] 
[commercial court] Paris, 1e ch. B, June 30, 2008, no. 2006065217 (Fr.), available at 
http://www.foruminternet.org/specialistes/veille-juridique/jurisprudence/IMG/pdf/tcom-
par20080630bisbis.pdf (€38.6 million (approximately $60.8 million) awarded to LVMH); 
Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Troyes, ch. civ., 
June 4, 2008, no. 06/02604 (Fr.), available at http://www.juriscom.net/documents/tg 
itroyes20080604.pdf  (€20,000 (approximately $31,000) awarded to Hermès). 
8 See, e.g., Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Par-
is, 3e ch., May 13, 2009, no. 07/11365 (Fr.), available at http://www.foruminternet. 
org/specialistes/veille-juridique/jurisprudence/IMG/pdf/tgi-par20090513.pdf; Tribunal de 
grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 3e ch., July 13, 2007, 
no. 07/05198 (Fr.), available at http://www.juriscom.net/documents/tgiparis20070713.pdf. 
9 Directive 2000/31/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 
on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Com-
merce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:178:0001:0016:EN:PDF. 
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(Internet Auction Decision I–III),10 the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), the high-
highest German court for civil and commercial matters, imposed 
monitoring obligations on eBay to prevent trademark infringement by third 
parties via its auction site under certain circumstances, but dismissed claims 
for damages for lack of fault.  In another case, L’Oréal SA v. eBay 
International AG,11 the High Court of England and Wales was sympathetic 
to eBay, but referred the case to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and 
requested the ECJ’s ruling on certain issues related to EU law before 
reaching a final decision.12  The ECJ held that an operator of an online 
marketplace will be exempt from secondary liability under the E-Commerce 
Directive if the operator has not played an “active role” in assisting or 
promoting the merchant and the data that it hosts.13  This decision, along 
with the ECJ’s decision in Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier 
SA (Google v. Louis Vuitton),14 a dispute over keyword advertising, might 
aid in harmonizing future court decisions among the EU member states. 
The different results in the cases mentioned above raise an interesting 
set of questions: What is the underlying trademark law in these cases?  How 
different are national laws on the question of secondary liability for 
trademark infringement?  What is the reason for those differences?  Do they 
reflect fundamental differences between the national legal systems or 
different policies?  In what degree do courts in different countries and the 
national law makers differentiate between secondary trademark 
infringement on- and off-line?  What is the current EU position, and what 
are perspectives for European and international development?  Are there 
specific limitations of the liability of intermediary service providers on the 
 
10 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 11, 2004, 158 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 236 (Ger.) (Internet-
Versteigerung I); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 19, 2007, 172 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 119 (Ger.) (Internet-
Versteigerung II); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 30, 2008, 
MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 531, 2008 (Ger.) (Internet-Versteigerung III). 
11 [2009] EWHC 1094 (Ch) (Eng.). 
12 This was done pursuant to Article 234 of the Treaty Establishing the European Com-
munity, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/ 
en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/12002E_EN.pdf, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon Amending 
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 
13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. 
do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0001:0010:EN:PDF.  See also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union art. 267, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, availa-
ble at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:EN 
:PDF. 
13 Case C-324/09, L’Oréal, SA v. eBay, Int’l A.G., COURT OF JUST. OF THE EUR. UNION 
(July 12, 2011), http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=rechercher 
&numaff=C-324/09. 
14 Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier 
SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-02417. 
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Internet in the U.S., in Europe?  What are the liability and business implica-
implications for companies and service providers doing business in an 
environment that—like the Internet—touches numerous jurisdictions with 
differing laws, economic systems, and policies? 
In this article, we will attempt to provide answers to the questions 
raised above by analyzing the Tiffany v. eBay decision and then comparing 
and contrasting it, from a doctrinal point of view, to recent German and 
French court decisions dealing with secondary liability of online 
marketplaces for trademark infringement.  As the expansion and success of 
online marketplaces like eBay illustrate, e-commerce itself is borderless.  
However, inconsistent national standards of secondary trademark 
infringement liability are likely to escalate costs on such merchants and 
prompt forum shopping and further litigation.  After our discussion of 
results and rationales in these cases, we propose a standard based broadly 
on that suggested in Tiffany as a means to harmonize the law of 
contributory trademark infringement across borders and within the realities 
of the business model of online intermediary markets. 
II.  SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
The Lanham Act is the source of federal trademark law in the United 
States.15  Under the Lanham Act, any commercial use of another firm’s 
mark without permission that causes a likelihood of confusion as to source 
or sponsorship of the goods or services constitutes direct trademark 
infringement.16  Injunctive relief is the primary remedy for infringement,17 
though actual damages, lost profits, and costs are also recoverable.18 
The type of direct infringement that results when the defendant uses 
the identical mark owned by the plaintiff on the same type of goods and 
sells those goods in direct competition with the plaintiff is often referred to 
as trademark counterfeiting.19  The Lanham Act defines a counterfeit mark 
as a spurious mark that is identical to, or substantially indistinguishable 
from, a mark that is in use and registered.20  Consumers who purchase 
 
15 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–72, 1091–96, 1111–27, 1141, 1141a–41n (2010). 
16 See id. § 1125(a)(1)(A).  To prove infringement in cases where the mark used by the 
defendant is not identical, the court will consider an array of factors, including: similarity of 
the marks, proximity of the goods or services, evidence of actual confusion, defendant’s in-
tent, strength of the plaintiff’s mark, likelihood of bridging the gap, consumer sophistication, 
and marketing channels used by the parties.  See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 
341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d 
Cir. 1963). 
17 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). 
18 Id. § 1117(a). 
19 Id. § 1114(1)(b).  The Lanham Act authorizes seizure of any counterfeit goods or 
marks.  Id. § 1116(d)(4)(B). 
20 Id. § 1116(d)(1)(B). 
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counterfeit goods are likely to be confused into believing that they have 
purchased genuine goods.21 
The conditions for imposing liability on those who are not direct 
infringers are not defined in the Lanham Act.  Rather, indirect or secondary 
liability for trademark infringement is a judicially-created doctrine that has 
been imported from the common law of torts.22  According to principles of 
indirect tort liability, “one is subject to liability if he permits [a third 
person] to act with his instrumentalities, knowing or having reason to know 
that the other is acting or will act tortiously . . . .”23 
There are two routes to proving secondary trademark liability.  
Vicarious infringement arises when there is an agency or similar type of 
relationship between the defendant and the direct infringer, or when the 
defendant and direct infringer jointly own or control the means of 
infringement.24  The second type of liability, contributory infringement, has 
been at the heart of the dispute between Tiffany and eBay.  Liability for 
contributory infringement arises when the defendant either actively induces 
another to directly infringe the plaintiff’s trademark, or continues to supply 
a product to another who is directly infringing the plaintiff’s trademark.25 
A.  Liability for Contributory Trademark Infringement 
The standard for determining liability for contributory infringement 
was first enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Inwood 
Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories.26  The defendant in that case was a 
pharmaceuticals manufacturer that continued to supply generic drugs to 
retail pharmacists who were relabeling them with another manufacturer’s 
trademark.  In analyzing whether the defendant was indirectly liable for the 
pharmacist’s infringing activities, the Court explained: 
[L]iability for trademark infringement can extend beyond those who 
actually mislabel goods with the mark of another.  Even if a 
manufacturer does not directly control others in the chain of 
distribution, it can be held responsible for their infringing activities 
 
21 See TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 94–95 (2d Cir. 2001). 
22 See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148 
(7th Cir. 1992).  Citing the Restatement of Torts, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that a third 
party “is responsible for the torts of those it permits on its premises ‘knowing or having rea-
son to know that the other is acting or will act tortuously . . . .’”  Id. at 1149. 
23 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(c) & cmt. d (1979). 
24 See David Berg & Co. v. Gatto Int’l Trading Co., 884 F.2d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(explaining that vicarious infringement occurs when a party is in privity with the direct in-
fringer); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Lee, 547 F. Supp. 2d 667 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (holding 
that vicarious liability requires a finding of a partnership or agency relationship); see also 
MARY LAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAW 257–60 (2d ed. 2009). 
25 See Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 854–55 (1982). 
26 Id. 
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under certain circumstances.  Thus, if a manufacturer or distributor 
intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it 
continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason 
to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or 
distributor is contributorily responsible for any harm done as a result 
of the deceit.27 
The courts have applied the Inwood decision to find that operators of 
intermediary markets, such as flea markets and swap meets, can be held 
liable for the infringing activities of their vendors under certain 
circumstances.  In these cases, the key issue has been the extent of 
knowledge necessary to impose liability on the intermediary who continues 
to supply the direct infringer with a product or service. 
In Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc.,28 the 
owner of the Hard Rock trademark sued the owner and operator of a flea 
market for contributory infringement after discovering that vendors at the 
flea market were selling counterfeit items.  The court of appeals began its 
analysis by pointing out that the defendant could be liable for trademark 
violations by the vendors if it knew or had reason to know of them, and that 
willful blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge for purposes of the 
Lanham Act.29  According to the court, “[t]o be willfully blind, a person 
must suspect wrongdoing and deliberately fail to investigate.”30  Therefore, 
a defendant could not be liable for contributory infringement for mere 
failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent direct infringement.31  As 
the court explained: 
CSI [the flea market owner] has no affirmative duty to take 
precautions against the sale of counterfeits.  Although the “reason to 
know” part of the standard for contributory liability requires CSI (or 
its agents) to understand what a reasonably prudent person would 
understand, it does not impose any duty to seek out and prevent 
violations.  We decline to extend the protection that Hard Rock finds 
in the common law to require CSI, and other landlords, to be more 
dutiful guardians of Hard Rock’s commercial interests.32 
While the flea market owner could still be liable for contributory 
infringement, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to the 
district court to determine whether the defendant had reason to know of the 
vendor’s trademark violations, choosing not to immediately order an 
 
27 Id. 
28 955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992). 
29 Id. at 1149. 
30 Id. 
31 See id. 
32 Id. (citation omitted). 
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imposition of contributory liability.33 
Likewise, in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,34 the owners of 
trademarks and copyrights for musical recordings sued a swap meet owner 
for contributory infringement.  The local sheriff had raided the swap meet 
and seized more than 38,000 counterfeit recordings.  The following year, 
after finding that vendors at the swap meet were still selling counterfeit 
recordings, the sheriff sent a letter notifying Cherry Auction of the on-going 
sales of infringing materials, and reminding Cherry Auction that it had 
agreed to provide the sheriff with identifying information from each vendor.  
In addition, the defendant’s investigator had observed sales of counterfeit 
recordings.  Based on these facts, there was no dispute that Cherry Auction 
and its operators were aware that vendors in the swap meet were selling 
counterfeit recordings.  Relying on the Inwood and Hard Rock precedents, 
the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals determined that “a swap meet can not 
disregard its vendors’ blatant trademark infringements with impunity.”35  
Thus, the trademark owner had adequately stated a claim for contributory 
trademark infringement.36 
The Inwood test and the analogous Hard Rock and Fonovisa 
precedents provide useful guidance in analyzing the contributory liability 
issue in the litigation between Tiffany and eBay.  These cases and others 
have made clear that contributory liability exists when the defendant 
supplies a product to a distributor and intentionally induces the distributor 
to use that product to directly infringe a trademark, or when the defendant 
has actual or constructive knowledge that the product is being used to 
infringe a trademark. 
B.  The Tiffany and eBay Business Models 
For over 170 years, Tiffany & Co. has been an internationally 
recognized seller of high end jewelry, watches, and related luxury items.37  
Tiffany owns U.S. registrations for its family of famous marks, which 
include TIFFANY, TIFFANY & CO., and T & CO., along with various 
designs.38  All of its goods are closely inspected to meet Tiffany’s quality 
standards.  Tiffany does not make its quality standards available to the 
public or to other jewelry manufacturers.  In addition, Tiffany closely 
controls the distribution of its goods.39  Since 2000, all new Tiffany jewelry 
sold in the United States has been available exclusively through Tiffany’s 
 
33 Id. at 1150. 
34 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
35 Id. at 265. 
36 Id. 
37 About Tiffany, TIFFANY & CO., http://www.tiffany.com/About/Default.aspx?isMenu 
=1& (last visited Nov. 25, 2011). 
38 See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 471–72. 
39 Id. at 472–73. 
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retail stores, catalogs, and website, and through its corporate sales depart-
department.  It does not use liquidators, sell overstock merchandise, or sell 
its goods at discounted prices.40 
eBay, Inc., is an online auction website that facilitates commercial 
transactions between individual buyers and sellers, including small 
businesses.  Founded in 1995 and drawing more than 97 million current 
active users worldwide, eBay describes itself as “the world’s largest online 
marketplace, where practically anyone can buy and sell practically 
anything. . . .  [eBay users’] collective impact on e-commerce is staggering: 
In 2010, the total worth of goods sold on eBay was $62 billion.”41  eBay 
generates revenue by charging sellers a fee to list their goods for sale and by 
deducting a percentage of the price for which the goods are sold.42 
At no time does eBay take physical possession of the goods available 
for purchase on its site.  Nevertheless, eBay exercises some control over 
those who do business on its website by requiring all users to register with 
eBay and to sign eBay’s User Agreement.  The User Agreement requires 
users to refrain from violating any laws, third party rights, including 
intellectual property rights, and eBay policies.  If a user violates the User 
Agreement, eBay may take disciplinary action against the user, including 
removing the user’s listings, issuing a warning, or suspending the user.43 
To combat fraud and counterfeiting, eBay has instituted several 
measures.  One such measure is the eBay fraud engine, which utilizes rules 
and complex models to monitor the website and automatically search for 
activity that violates eBay policies.  eBay spends over $5 million per year in 
maintaining and enhancing the fraud engine, which is mainly dedicated to 
identifying fraudulent and counterfeit listings.44  For example, eBay 
monitors its website for and removes listings that expressly offer “knock-
off,” “counterfeit,” “replica,” or “pirated” merchandise, and listings in 
which the user “cannot guarantee the authenticity” of the goods being 
offered for sale.45 
In addition to the fraud engine, eBay has instituted a set of procedures, 
known as the Verified Rights Owner (VeRO) Program, to address listings 
offering potentially infringing items posted on the website.46  The VeRO 
Program is a “notice-and-takedown” system, whereby rights owners can 
report to eBay any listing offering potentially infringing items so that eBay 
can remove such reported listings.47  The VeRO Program places the 
 
40 Id. 
41 Who We Are, EBAY, http://www.ebayinc.com/who (last visited Nov. 25, 2011). 
42 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d. at 474–75. 
43 Id. at 478–79. 
44 Id. at 477. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 478. 
47 Id. at 477–78. 
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responsibility on rights owners to police their trademarks and copyrights.48 
A rights owner who discovers a potentially infringing item listed on 
the site can report the listing directly to eBay by submitting a Notice of 
Claimed Infringement form (NOCI).  A NOCI attests that the rights owner 
possesses a “good-faith belief” that the item infringes on a copyright or a 
trademark.49  If a NOCI contains all of the required information and has 
indicia of accuracy, eBay promptly removes the challenged listing within 
24 hours of receiving the NOCI.50  Indeed, eBay removes thousands of 
listings each week based on the submission of NOCIs by rights holders.51 
C.  The Tiffany v. eBay Litigation 
In 2003, after discovering that substantial quantities of counterfeit 
Tiffany merchandise were being sold on eBay, Tiffany contacted eBay in an 
effort to curtail the sale of such items.  Tiffany remained unsatisfied with 
eBay’s efforts to remedy the counterfeiting problem and filed suit against 
eBay for contributory trademark infringement, asserting that eBay 
facilitated the advertisement and sale of counterfeit Tiffany jewelry on its 
website.52  The first type of contributory infringement identified in the 
Inwood case did not apply because Tiffany did not allege that eBay 
intentionally induced infringement of Tiffany’s marks.  Rather, Tiffany 
asserted that eBay continued to provide its auction services despite its 
knowledge, or reason for knowing, that counterfeit Tiffany merchandise 
was being sold. 
Following a trial, the district court ruled in favor of eBay on all 
claims.53  The district court concluded that while eBay possessed general 
knowledge as to counterfeiting on its website, such generalized knowledge 
was insufficient under the Inwood test to impose upon eBay an affirmative 
duty to remedy the problem.54  Tiffany then appealed to the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals.  On appeal, the court first ruled that eBay was not liable 
for direct trademark infringement.55  According to the court, eBay properly 
used Tiffany’s mark on its website to describe accurately the genuine 
Tiffany goods offered for sale and none of eBay’s uses of the mark 
suggested that Tiffany affiliated itself with eBay or endorsed the sale of its 
 
48 576 F. Supp. 2d. at 478. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 481–82. 
53 Id. at 527. 
54 Id. at 511–15.  Thus, the standard was not whether eBay could “reasonably anticipate” 
infringement, but whether eBay continued to supply its services to users when it knew or had 
reason to know of infringement by those users. 
55 Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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products through its site.56 
The court next turned to the issue of whether eBay was liable for 
contributory trademark infringement.57  Tiffany did “not argue that eBay 
induced the sale of counterfeit Tiffany goods on its website.”58  As such, the 
court reiterated the second part of the Inwood test for proving contributory 
liability for trademark infringement: the defendant must (1) have actual or 
constructive knowledge of the direct infringement and (2) continue to do 
business with the infringer despite such knowledge or reason to know of the 
infringing conduct.59  The court of appeals determined that Tiffany was 
required to prove that eBay had more than “a general knowledge or reason 
to know that its service is being used to sell counterfeit goods” to satisfy the 
knowledge prong of the Inwood test.60  More specifically, the court required 
“some contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are infringing 
or will infringe in the future,” and a subsequent failure to act on such 
knowledge constituting “willful blindness,” in order to satisfy both 
elements of contributory trademark infringement.61 
Tiffany argued that eBay failed the Inwood test because it continued to 
supply services to sellers of counterfeit goods while knowing or having 
reason to know that such sellers were infringing on Tiffany’s mark.  
However, the court determined that eBay’s generalized knowledge of 
trademark infringement by users of its site did not impose an affirmative 
duty to remedy the problem.62  The court emphasized eBay’s internal 
controls and procedures for detecting and removing counterfeit goods from 
its website.  In particular, the court observed that eBay spends $20 million 
per year on these efforts and maintains an entire department of employees 
dedicated to fraud prevention.63  eBay also works with trademark owners, 
including Tiffany, to detect and notify eBay of suspected counterfeiters.64 
The Court of Appeals also noted that eBay has an incentive to 
 
56 Id. at 103. 
57 The facts of the case would not have supported a claim based on vicarious liability, 
since eBay sellers had no actual or apparent authority to contract on behalf of eBay, and 
were not subject to eBay’s direct control. 
58 Id. at 106. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 107; accord Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
439 n.19 (1984). 
61 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109–10. 
62 Id. at 108–09. 
63 See id.; see also Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 476. 
64 When eBay detects or is alerted to signs of counterfeit goods on its site, eBay responds 
swiftly within 24 hours and suspends or takes down the suspect auction page. This is fol-
lowed by a formal investigation and permanent page or seller cancellation in the event that 
actual fraud is detected.  In some instances, eBay will refund a purchaser’s money if a coun-
terfeit item was purchased on eBay.  Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 98–100; see also Tiffany, 576 F. 
Supp. 2d at 478. 
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eliminate the sale of counterfeit goods on its website in order to maintain 
the confidence of eBay customers in the authenticity of the goods they are 
purchasing.65  As such, the court concluded that eBay did not have the 
specific knowledge of infringement required by the Inwood test and that 
eBay’s efforts to fight counterfeiting did not amount to willful ignorance.66  
Having found an absence of actual or constructive knowledge of specific 
individuals selling counterfeit merchandise, the court unanimously held that 
eBay was not liable for contributory trademark infringement.67 
1.  Implications and Aftermath of the Tiffany v. eBay Decision 
The Second Circuit’s decision is instructive on several fronts.  First, 
the decision provides guidance to online markets as to the likely scope of 
their liability for secondary trademark infringement under U.S. law.  To be 
liable for contributory infringement, an operator of an online market must 
either intentionally induce trademark infringement by its users, or continue 
to provide access to its services to specific users whom it knows, or has 
reason to know, are engaging in direct infringement.68  By requiring specific 
knowledge of infringing activity, rather than general awareness, the 
decision places the ultimate responsibility for policing the use of 
trademarks on the trademark owner.69 
Further, the decision underscores the importance of proactively 
implementing anti-counterfeiting policies and procedures.  If, when an 
online market has been notified of specific instances of infringing activity, 
it takes affirmative steps to eliminate such activity, then it will be 
immunized from liability for contributory infringement.  Such evidence 
proved crucial to the court of appeals in Tiffany, as the court’s finding that 
eBay was neither encouraging nor ignoring violations of trademark owners’ 
rights was dispositive. 
The standard that emerges in Tiffany is broadly consistent with that 
applied to online service providers under the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA).70  Under the DMCA, an online service provider is exempt 
 
65 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109. 
66 Id. at 109–10. 
67 Tiffany had also alleged that eBay was liable for contributory trademark dilution.  The 
appellate court affirmed the district court’s holding that eBay was not liable for dilution be-
cause, as eBay “did not itself sell the goods at issue, it did not itself engage in dilution,” and 
because Tiffany had conceded that its contributory dilution claim would fail if its contributo-
ry trademark infringement claim failed.  Id. at 111–12.  However, the court remanded the 
case to the district court for reconsideration of its conclusion that eBay was not liable for 
false advertising.  Id. 
68 Id. at 106. 
69 Nor is it likely that general warnings or demand letters will be sufficient to impute spe-
cific knowledge to the intermediary market operator.  See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Net-
work Solutions, 985 F. Supp. 949, 965 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
70 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–05, 1301–32 (2010); 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2010). 
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from secondary liability for the copyright infringement of its users when it 
has adopted, implemented, and informed users of its policy providing for 
termination of users who repeatedly infringe copyrights.71  This is 
accomplished in part by a notice-and-takedown requirement that allows 
copyright owners to notify an online service provider of allegedly 
infringing content on its system.  After receiving such notice, the online 
service provider must block or remove such content.72  The notice must 
specifically identify the work allegedly infringed and must be specific 
enough to allow the online service provider to locate the infringing 
material.73  Additionally, the online service provider must have adopted 
standard technical measures to identify and protect copyrighted works.74  
Notably, online service providers do not need to monitor or affirmatively 
search for infringing content to be exempt from liability.75 
As such, the DMCA regime shields online service providers from 
secondary liability unless they have actively failed to discourage 
infringement by their users and have actual knowledge of directly 
infringing material but have failed to remove it.  This is consistent with the 
court’s examination of eBay’s conduct in the Tiffany case.  Indeed, eBay 
was immune from secondary liability for sale of infringing DVDs on its site 
in Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc.76  The court in Hendrickson found that eBay 
had implemented a notice-and-takedown policy that complied with the 
requirements of the DMCA and responded expeditiously to a notice from 
the copyright owner.77  Furthermore, the court held that eBay did not have 
actual or constructive knowledge of the infringing material because the 
plaintiff’s notice failed to comply “substantially” with the DMCA notice 
requirements.78 
In addition to its alignment with the DMCA, the ruling in Tiffany v. 
eBay also makes sense from a practical business perspective in that it places 
the primary responsibility on the trademark owner to monitor the use of its 
mark by others.  It is impossible for eBay to inspect and accurately 
determine the authenticity of every item for sale on its site because eBay 
would need to take physical possession of all items offered for sale and 
determine whether each user is selling genuine goods.  The result would 
likely diminish the functionality of eBay’s site.  Because operators of online 
markets would not be willing to devote substantial resources and time to 
authenticate every item for sale on its site, it is unlikely that they would 
 
71 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A). 
72 Id. § 512(c)(2)–(3). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. § 512(I)(1)(B). 
75 Id. § 512(m). 
76 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
77 See id. at 1089–92. 
78 Id. at 1093. 
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obey every request to remove merchandise, even if it was in fact genuine or 
if the use of another’s mark was non-infringing.  In the end, a standard 
based on generalized knowledge of direct infringement would be financially 
ruinous to the online auction business model. 
Aside from its implications for online auction sites, Tiffany may be 
influential in deciding cases involving other online intermediaries.  For 
instance, assume that a manufacturer discovers that counterfeits of its 
luxury merchandise are being sold on websites on servers owned by a 
certain web hosting provider.  The manufacturer sends a number of 
takedown notices to the web hosting provider, which fails to respond and 
which otherwise has taken no measures to limit the infringing activity 
taking place on its system.  If the manufacturer sues the web hosting 
provider for contributory infringement, is it likely that the web hosting 
provider’s failure to act would lead to a finding of contributory liability?  
This was the situation in Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, 
Inc.,79 where a web host, Akanoc, hosted Chinese retailers selling 
counterfeit Louis Vuitton goods.  After Akanoc ignored numerous 
takedown notices, Louis Vuitton sued for contributory trademark 
infringement. 
The case went to trial and the jury returned a verdict for Louis Vuitton, 
holding Akanoc liable for contributory infringement.80  On appeal, Akanoc 
argued that the jury instructions were erroneous because a “contribution to 
infringement must be intentional for liability to arise.”81  The Ninth Circuit 
disagreed, holding that Louis Vuitton was required to prove only that 
Akanoc provided its service with actual or constructive knowledge that its 
users were engaging in trademark infringement.82  Thus, an express finding 
of intent is not required.  The court vacated and remanded with instructions 
that the district court award statutory damages in the amount of 
$10,500,000 for contributory trademark infringement.83 
The outcome in Akanoc appears to be broadly consistent with the 
rationale of the court in Tiffany.  Akanoc’s failure to promptly respond to 
takedown notices, along with its specific knowledge of direct infringement, 
amounted to willful blindness that led to contributory liability.  In the same 
vein, Tiffany may be persuasive in resolving claims against domain name 
registrars84 and search engines that sell trademarks as keywords to produce 
 
79 2011 WL 4014320 (9th Cir. 2011). 
80 See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1098 
(N.D. Cal. 2008). 
81 2011 WL 4014320, at *4. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at *8. 
84 See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).  
In Lockheed Martin, the court ruled that a domain name registrar was not liable for contribu-
tory infringement because it did not directly control or monitor the activities of its regis-
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a list of websites or advertisements containing the search terms.  In Rosetta 
Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc.,85 the court granted summary judgment in favor 
of Google on a contributory infringement claim against Google for selling 
allegedly infringing adwords that triggered sponsored links.  Citing Tiffany, 
the court held that Google lacked the requisite specific intent because it 
contractually prohibits advertising of counterfeit goods, honors takedown 
notices, and, like eBay, Google had no way of confirming if advertisers 
were selling genuine or counterfeit goods.86 
In a post-Tiffany case involving a luxury brand mark, Gucci America, 
Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp.,87 the owner of the famous GUCCI 
trademarks filed an action for contributory trademark infringement and 
counterfeiting against two credit card processors and a business that 
assisted an online seller of counterfeit products in setting up credit card 
processing services.  In denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the 
court held that the complaint sufficiently alleged contributory infringement 
under the same standard applied in Tiffany.88  The court found that one 
defendant had intentionally induced trademark infringement by marketing 
itself as specializing in services for high risk accounts for merchants selling 
“replica products,” and that the other two defendants had exerted sufficient 
control over the infringing activities and had knowingly provided services 
essential to the sale of counterfeit items.89 
Whether the reasoning in Tiffany will be adopted by the U.S. courts of 
appeals in other circuits is a question that remains to be answered.  If not, 
the decisions of several European courts that have addressed the issue of 
secondary trademark infringement liability of online marketplaces may 
offer a line of reasoning less sympathetic to the operators of online markets. 
 
trants, some of which had registered domain names containing the plaintiff’s registered ser-
vice marks. 
85 730 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
86 See id. at 548–49; see also Sellify, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2010 WL 4455830 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding there had been no vicarious or contributory infringement because 
there was no evidence that the direct infringer was Amazon’s agent or that Amazon had had 
particular knowledge of the infringing activities).  But c.f. Government Employees Ins. Co. 
v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004) (holding that the sale of trademark 
keywords was a commercial use of the mark necessary to support a claim of contributory 
infringement). 
87 721 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
88 Id. at 253. 
89 Id. at 249–53.  In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa International Service Ass’n, a similar case 
decided before Tiffany, two credit card processing services were held not liable for contribu-
tory infringement when their services were used in the sale of infringing photographs.  The 
court held that the credit card services neither exercised control nor had specific knowledge 
of the directly infringing activities.  494 F.3d 788, 801 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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III.  SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
In the member states of the European Union, national trademark law 
and EU trademark law co-exist.  Each EU member state has its own 
national trademark law, such as the German Trademarks Act, Markengesetz 
(MarkenG),90 or the U.K. Trade Marks Act 1994.91  In France, statutory 
provisions on trademark law are part of the Intellectual Property Code, 
Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle (CPI).92  The harmonized EU trademark 
law approximates, supplements, or replaces the domestic trademark law of 
individual EU member states regarding secondary liability for trademark 
infringement. 
A.  EU Trademark Law 
Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 October 2008 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States 
Relating to Trade Marks93 (Trade Marks Directive) harmonizes the 
trademark laws of the EU member states.  The Trade Marks Directive does 
not have any direct effect; it needs instead to be transposed into national 
law by the legislature of each individual EU member state, according to 
Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(formerly Article 249 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community).94  Therefore, trademark law in the EU member states is not 
identical, but based on a uniform minimum standard as set down by the 
Trade Marks Directive.  Furthermore, many provisions of the Trade Marks 
Directive have been taken over quasi-literally by national statutes. 
Even if the Trade Marks Directive lacks direct effect and national 
trademark protection varies, however, according to the ECJ decisions in 
Leur-Bloem v. Inspecteur95 and Giloy v. Hauptzollamt,96 national trademark 
 
90 Gesetz über den Schutz von Marken und sonstigen Kennzeichen [Markengesetz] 
[German Trade Mark Act], Oct. 25, 1994, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 3082 
(Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/markeng/. 
91 Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26 (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/ 
acts1994/ukpga_19940026_en_1.htm. 
92 See CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C. PRO. INTELL.] art. L711-17, R712-18 
(Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT 
000006069414&dateTexte=20100814. 
93 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. 
do?uri=OJ:L:2008:299:0025:0033:EN:PDF. 
94 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU], available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUri 
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:EN:PDF.  An EU directive only has di-
rect effect, if it has not been correctly transformed into national law within the time limit set 
down in the directive, if it is sufficiently clear and precisely stated, unconditional or non-
dependent, and confers a specific right for the citizen to base his or her claim upon.  See 
Case 41/74, Yvonne van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 01337. 
95 Case C-28/95, A. Leur-Bloem v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst/Ondernemingen Am-
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laws must be interpreted in accordance with the Trade Marks Directive and 
the economic and political goals it sets forth.  In order to ensure a uniform 
application of the Trade Marks Directive, and in accordance with Article 
267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, any domestic 
court of an EU member state that needs to interpret a provision in national 
trademark law that is based on the Trade Marks Directive: 
[M]ay, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to 
enable it to give judgment, request the Court [of Justice of the 
European Union] to give a ruling thereon.  Where any such question 
is raised in a case pending before the highest court or tribunal of a 
Member State, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the 
Court [of Justice of the European Union].97 
In addition to the Trade Marks Directive, Council Regulation (EC) No 
207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community Trade Mark98 
(Community Trade Mark Regulation) regulates the Community Trade 
Mark.  A Community Trade Mark is a trademark registered with the Office 
of Harmonization for the Internal Market (OHIM) in a single registration 
procedure.99  Upon registration the trademark is valid in the European 
Union as a whole—that is, its protection cannot be limited to certain 
member states.  A Community Trade Mark confers to its proprietor an 
exclusive right to use the trademark and to prevent third parties from using, 
without consent, the same or a similar mark for identical or similar goods 
and/or services as those protected by the Community Trade Mark.100  A 
Community Trade Mark is valid for 10 years and can be renewed 
indefinitely for periods of ten years.101 
In contrast to some national laws which protect registered and 
unregistered trademarks,102 the Community Trade Mark grants its proprietor 
the right to prevent unauthorized use of the mark in trade without his/her 
consent only if the trademark has been registered.103  The proprietor of a 
Community Trade Mark can act against trademark infringements by taking 
 
sterdam 2, 1997 E.C.R. I-4161. 
96 Case C-130/95, Bernd Giloy v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Ost, 1997 E.C.R. I-
4291. 
97 TFEU art. 267. 
98 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri 
Serv.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:078:0001:0042:EN:PDF. 
99 See id. art. 1. 
100 See What is a Community Trade Mark (CTM)?, OFFICE OF HARMONIZATION IN THE 
INTERNAL MARKET, http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/CTM/communityTradeMark 
/communityTradeMark.en.do (last updated Apr. 15, 2009). 
101 Id. 
102 See, e.g., Gesetz über den Schutz von Marken und sonstigen Kennzeichen 
[Markengesetz] [German Trade Mark Act], Oct. 25, 1994, BGBL I at 3082, §4(2) (Ger.). 
103 Council Regulation 207/2009, art. 6, 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1 (EC). 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 32:37 (2011) 
54 
measures expressly provided for under the Community Trade Mark Regula-
Regulation, in relation to disputes concerning the infringement and validity 
of Community Trade Marks, via proceedings in the Community Trade 
Mark courts established under the Community Trade Mark Regulation.104  
Community Trade Mark courts function as specifically designated national 
courts in the EU member states.105  It is important to note, as well, that 
community trademark law does not replace national trademark law.106  
Small- and mid-sized companies that operate solely within a national 
market might not find a special interest in registering a trademark as a 
Community Trade Mark.107 
Some of the European eBay decisions refer to both national and 
Community Trade Marks,108 others to national trademarks only.109  
Alternatively, as in the case of the German Internet litigation Internet-
Versteigerung I, some trademark infringement disputes have not been 
brought via proceedings in Community Trade Mark courts but in national 
civil courts.110  In such cases, the Community Trade Mark Regulation does 
not apply; rather, national trademark law, as harmonized by the EU Trade 
Marks Directive, is applicable. 
B.  Liability for Contributory Trademark Infringement 
The conditions for imposing liability on parties who are not direct 
infringers are not defined in either the EU Trade Marks Directive or the EU 
Community Trade Mark Regulation.  Directive 2004/48/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights111 (Enforcement Directive) 
explicitly refers the regulation of conditions and procedures relating to 
injunctions against intermediaries to the national laws of the EU member 
states.112  Accordingly, the question of secondary liability is primarily a 
 
104 See What is a Community Trade Mark (CTM)?, supra note 100. 
105 Id. 
106 See Council Regulation 207/2009, pmbl., 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1 (EC). 
107 See HORST-PETER GÖTTING, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ 405 (9th ed. 2010). 
108 See, e.g., 172 BGHZ 119 (Ger.) (Internet-Versteigerung II); L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l 
AG, [2009] EWHC 1094 (Ch) (Eng.). 
109 See, e.g., Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] 
Troyes, ch. civ., June 4, 2008, no. 06/02604 (Fr.); Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of ap-
peal] Reims, ch. civ., July 20, 2010, no. 08/01519 (Fr.), available at http:// 
www.legalis.net/spip.php?page=breves-article&id_article=2960; Tribunal de grande instance 
[TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 3e ch., May 13, 2009, no. 07/11365 
(Fr.). 
110 See 158 BGHZ 236 (Ger.) (Internet-Versteigerung I). 
111 2004 O.J. (L 195) 0016, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri 
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0048R(01):EN:HTML. 
112 Id. pmbl., art. 11. 
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matter of national law.113 
1.  Germany 
In Germany, a civil law country, the primary source of trademark law 
is a federal statute, the German Trademarks Act, Markengesetz 
(MarkenG).114  Nevertheless, in Germany, case law plays a significant role 
in the interpretation and development of the written law.  Though court 
decisions in Germany are, following the civil law tradition, nonbinding, 
lower courts tend to follow the decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof, the 
highest German civil court, in order not to be overruled. 
Contrary to the EU Trade Marks Directive and French domestic law,115 
the German Trademarks Act protects not only registered but also 
unregistered trademarks.116  Furthermore, under German law, in contrast to 
the EU Trade Marks Directive, the trademark proprietor in the case of an 
unlawful infringement, in addition to being entitled to prevent the infringer 
from using the trademark, is entitled to collect damages for financial loss 
resulting from the infringement.117  The collection of damages, though, 
depends on an intentional or negligent trademark infringement.118 
Section 14(7) of the Markengesetz explicitly addresses secondary 
liability for trademark infringement.  The provision states that “[i]f the 
trademark infringement is caused by an employee or agent of a business, 
the owner of the business will be liable for such infringement . . . .”119  This 
standard equates to vicarious liability as defined under U.S. law.120  
However, section 14(7) of the MarkenG does not address contributory 
liability, as it refers merely to agents and employees (i.e., those who at least 
are under some control of the business owner).121   
Nevertheless, contributory liability as a general concept is not 
unknown under German trademark law.  Section 14(4) of the MarkenG 
 
113 See Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton 
Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-02417. 
114 Gesetz über den Schutz von Marken und sonstigen Kennzeichen [Markengesetz] 
[German Trade Mark Act], Oct. 25, 1994, BGBL I at 3082 (Ger.). 
115 See infra Part III.B.2. 
116 Gesetz über den Schutz von Marken und sonstigen Kennzeichen [Markengesetz] 
[German Trade Mark Act], Oct. 25, 1994, BGBL I at 3082, § 4(2) (Ger.). 
117 Id. § 14(6). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. § 14(7). 
120 See David Berg & Co. v. Gatto Int’l Trading Co., 884 F.2d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(explaining that vicarious infringement occurs when a party is in privity with the direct in-
fringer); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Lee, 547 F. Supp. 2d 667, 676 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (hold-
ing that vicarious liability requires a finding of a partnership or agency relationship); see also 
LAFRANCE, supra note 24, at 257. 
120 See Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
121 See KARL-HEINZ FEZER, MARKENRECHT 1060 (4th ed. 2009). 
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gives examples of activities which, under U.S. law, would qualify as con-
contributory liability: 
Without having the consent of the proprietor of the trade mark, third 
parties shall be prohibited in the course of trade from 
1. affixing a sign which is identical with or similar to the trade mark 
to packaging or wrappings or to means of marking such as labels, 
tags, sewn-on labels or the like; 
2. offering packaging, wrappings or the means of marking under a 
sign which is identical with or similar to the trade mark, putting them 
on the market or stocking them for these purposes under that sign; or, 
3. importing or exporting packaging, wrappings or means of marking 
under a sign which is identical with or similar to the trade mark, 
if there is a risk that the packaging or wrappings are being used for 
the packaging or the wrapping of goods or services, or the means of 
marking for marking goods or services, in respect of which, pursuant 
to subsections (2) and (3), third parties would be prohibited from 
using that sign.122 
Accordingly, in Ettaler Klosterliqueur, a German case very similar to 
the U.S. Inwood decision, the Bundesgerichtshof held the defendant liable 
for trademark infringement for producing labels which were identical to a 
trademark and—without using them himself—selling these labels to 
businesses who attached them to similar goods as those protected under the 
trademark.123  In a more recent decision, Ambiente.de, the 
Bundesgerichtshof recognized that the examples of contributory liability 
enumerated in section 14(4) of the MarkenG were not exclusive, and 
therefore applied the concept of contributory liability to a domain name 
registrar.124  However, according to the BGH, such secondary liability 
required an unlawful trademark infringement by a third party and intent on 
the part of the indirect infringer, which the court found lacking in this 
particular case.125  Generally, “intention” under German law means: 
[K]nowing and desiring the elements of the definition which 
constitutes tort.  It includes not only direct intention but also 
 
122 Gesetz über den Schutz von Marken und sonstigen Kennzeichen [Markengesetz] 
[German Trade Mark Act], Oct. 25, 1994, BGBL I at 3082, §14(4) (Ger.). 
123 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 18, 1955, 
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 179, 1956 (Ger.). 
124 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 17, 2001, 148 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 13 (Ger.); see also 
REINHARD INGERL & CHRISTIAN ROHNKE, MARKENGESETZ 136 (2d ed. 2003). 
125 See 148 BGHZ 13 (Ger.). 
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conditional intention.  It also involves knowledge that what is done is 
in breach of the law or the relevant duty in case of special 
relationships.  The difference between intention and negligence may 
depend on whether the defendant is prepared to take the risk of a 
perceived possible consequence occurring or whether he trusts it will 
not occur.126 
Thus, contributory liability in Germany is covered under general tort 
law, which is broader in scope and remains applicable in case a defendant is 
not liable under German trademark law.  The central provision in German 
tort law, section 823(1) of the German Civil Code, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
(BGB),127 reads: “A person who, intentionally or negligently, unlawfully 
injures the life, body, health, freedom, property or another right of another 
person is liable to make compensation to the other party for the damage 
arising from this.”128 
Accordingly, to establish contributory trademark liability under this 
provision, a claimant must have been harmed in one of the five specific 
rights listed in section 823(1) of the BGB.  According to a decision of the 
German Constitutional Court, intellectual property is considered to be 
property under section 823(1) of the BGB.129  In addition to proving a 
violation of its trademark, a plaintiff needs to prove an intentional or 
negligent act to claim damages.130  The meaning of intention under the BGB 
does not differ from the definition given above in the context of secondary 
trademark infringement under the MarkenG.  Meanwhile, “a person acts 
negligently if he fails to exercise reasonable care.”131  The standard is 
objective and not dependent on the individual capacity of the defendant.132  
In the case of an omission, the harm caused by the omission will only be 
illegal under German law if the injurer had a specific duty of care and the 
omitted act would otherwise have prevented the harm from arising.133  Such 
a duty may, for example, arise because the injurer has a close relationship to 
 
126 RAYMOND YOUNGS, ENGLISH, FRENCH & GERMAN COMPARATIVE LAW 363 (2d ed. 
2007) (quoting DIETER MEDICUS, SCHULDRECHT I, ALLGEMEINER TEIL 144, 145 (6th ed. 
1992)). 
127 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 42, 2909 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/bgb/. 
128 Id. § 823(1). 
129 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 7, 1971, 
31 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFG] 229 (Ger.). 
130 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002, BGBL I 42, 2909, § 
823(1) (Ger.). 
131 Id. § 276(1). 
132 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 21, 1963, 39 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 281 (Ger.). 
133 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Sept. 25, 1952, 7 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 204 (Ger.). 
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the injured, such as parents for their children,134 or the injurer is in control 
of premises or goods which might be dangerous to others.135 
Because section 823(1) of the BGB is dependent on intent or 
negligence, it turns out that rights owners, in certain situations, may lack 
necessary protection under general German tort law.  Therefore, German 
jurisprudence, unsatisfied with this insufficient protection under section 823 
of the BGB, and based on a mutatis mutandis application of sections 823 
and 1004 of the BGB, has created a judicial legal concept called 
“Störerhaftung,” which might be translated as “disquietor” or “disturber” 
liability.136  According to this concept, anyone who—without being an 
infringer or a participant—causally and wilfully contributes in any adequate 
way to the infringement of a protected right,137 and is in a position to 
prevent it,138 can be sued as a disquietor (Störer) for a trademark 
infringement.  Disquietor liability can be imposed irrespective of fault, and 
is aimed at injunctive relief, not damages.139 
The German eBay decisions, analyzed below,140 are based on these 
statutory provisions and the German case law on disquietor liability.  The 
secondary liability of eBay in these decisions depends heavily on the 
interpretation of intent and negligence by the German courts under the 
specific circumstances of online marketplaces and the monitory obligations 
the courts are willing to impose on companies like eBay. 
2.  France 
In France, trademark law is regulated under Articles L711 to L717 of 
the French Intellectual Property Code, Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle 
(CPI), which is supplemented by a number of executive acts starting at 
Article R712-1 of the CPI.  The French code provisions correspond to the 
provisions of the EU Trade Marks Directive and are interpreted by French 
courts in accordance with EU law and the European Court of Justice’s 
decisions,141 even if the wording of the French trademark laws are—
 
134 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 16, 1979, 73 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 190 (Ger.). 
135 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 26, 1966, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1456, 1966 (Ger.). 
136 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 18, 1955, 
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 492, 1955 (Ger.); Bun-
desgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 15, 1957, GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] GRUR 352, 1957 (Ger.). 
137 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 18, 2001, 
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 618 (619), 2002 (Ger.). 
138 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 30, 1981, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 440, 1982 (Ger.). 
139 See GRUR 618 (619), 2002 (Ger.). 
140 See infra Part III.D.1. 
141 See PAUL LANGE, INTERNATIONALES HANDBUCH DES MARKEN UND 
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following a “Napoleonic tradition”142—often less concise than that used by 
the European legislators. 
In contrast to German and U.S. law, under French law, ownership of a 
mark can be acquired only by registration.143  This is in accordance with the 
EU Trade Marks Directive, which requires protection only for registered 
trademarks.144  The effects of registration begin on the filing date of the 
application and continue for a term of 10 years, which can be renewed any 
number of times.145  Unlike U.S. or British trademark law, French 
trademark law does not require the use of a trademark for its validity.146  
Nevertheless, after an owner has not put his mark to use for an 
uninterrupted period of five years, without good reason, he shall be liable to 
revocation of his rights.147 
Counterfeiting constitutes a cause of action under French trademark 
law.  According to the CPI, registration of a mark confers on its owner a 
right of property in that mark for the goods and services that he or she has 
designated.148  According to Article L713-2 of the CPI: 
The following shall be prohibited, unless authorized by the owner: 
a) The reproduction, use or affixing of a mark, even with the addition 
of words such as: “formula, manner, system, imitation, type, 
method,” or the use of a reproduced mark for goods or services that 
are identical to those designated in the registration; 149 
* * * 
Also, according to Article L713-3 of the CPI: 
The following shall be prohibited, unless authorized by the owner, if 
 
KENNZEICHENRECHTS 1196–1202 (2009). 
142 Following the French Revolution, Emperor Napoléon wanted the French Civil Code 
to be drafted “for the people” (i.e., in a manner such that ordinary people, not only legal ex-
perts, would be able to understand).  See P. ANTOINE FENET, 1 RECUEIL DES TRAVAUX 
PREPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL 3 (1836), available at http://books.google. 
com/books?id=LVfiAAAAMAAJ&pg=PR63&dq=Bigot-Pr%C3%A9ameneu,+Recueil+ 
des+Travaux+pr%C3%A9paratoires+du+Code+Civil,+Fenet,+Volume+1&hl=fr&ei=tx2GT
NSTEo7eOKL9rbYI&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCsQ6AEwAA
#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
143 CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C. PRO. INTELL.] art. L712-1 (Fr.). 
144 Directive 2008/95/EC, art. 1, 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25.  As previously discussed, the EU 
Trade Marks Directive provides a minimum standard only; any EU member state is free to 
provide higher protection.  See supra Part III.A. 
145 CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C. PRO. INTELL.] art. L712-1 (Fr.). 
146 See id. arts. L712-2 & L712-7. 
147 Id. art. L714-5. 
148 Id. art. L713-1. 
149 Id. art. L713-2. 
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there is a likelihood of confusion in the mind of the public: 
a) The reproduction, use or affixing of a mark or use of a reproduced 
mark for goods or services that are similar to those designated in the 
registration; 
b) The imitation of a mark and the use of an imitated mark for goods 
or services that are identical or similar to those designated in the 
registration.150 
Another form of direct counterfeiting prohibited under French law is 
expressed in Article L716-10 of the CPI.  Under this provision, anybody 
shall be punishable for trademark infringement who: 
a) Without lawful reason, holds goods he knows to bear a counterfeit 
mark or has knowingly sold, offered for sale, furnished or offered to 
furnish goods or services under such mark; 
b) Has knowingly delivered a product or furnished a service other 
than that requested of him under a registered mark;151 
* * * 
The French courts in the eBay cases had to decide whether eBay 
knowingly offered counterfeit goods for sale on its online auction platform, 
and whether eBay was therefore liable for direct counterfeiting according to 
Article L716-10 of the CPI.152 
As a legal consequence, infringement of the rights of a trademark 
owner constitutes an offense for which the offender would incur civil 
liability,153 which includes, as in German law, damages for prejudice to the 
owner of the trademark.  In addition to civil sanctions, French law provides 
that trademark infringement may give rise to penal sanctions, such as fines 
or imprisonment.154  The court may also order a closing down of the 
business of the trademark infringer155 or the publication of the court ruling 
in a newspaper.156 
Articles L713-2 and L713-3 of the CPI concern direct infringements 
only.  Unlike German trademark law as expressed in section 14(4) of the 
MarkenG,157 in French intellectual property law, contributory liability is 
 
150 Id. art. L713-3. 
151 Id. art. L716-10. 
152 See infra Part III.D.2. 
153 CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C. PRO. INTELL.] art. L716-1 (Fr.). 
154 See id. arts. L716-9 to L716-11. 
155 Id. art. L716-11-1. 
156 Id. art. L716-13. 
157 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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expressly regulated only for patents.158  We have found no evidence in 
French jurisprudence or literature which justifies extending secondary 
liability to trademarks, particularly when such regulation is not expressly 
provided for under statute.  On the contrary, the fact that secondary liability 
is expressly regulated for patents but not for trademarks suggests that 
French lawmakers did not intend to regulate or impose secondary liability 
for trademarks.159 
Similar to German law, general tort law remains applicable for 
secondary trademark infringements in France.160  In contrast to German 
law, French jurisprudence has not developed a legal instrument similar to 
the German Störerhaftung disquietor liability.  The reason for this is that the 
basic provision in French law on tort liability is much broader than the 
German provision in section 823 of the BGB.161  So thus far, there has been 
no need for an analogous concept to disquietor liability.  Article 1382 of the 
French Civil Code (Code Civil) reads: “Any act whatever of man, which 
causes damage to another, obliges the one by whose fault [“faute”] it 
occurred, to compensate it.”162 
The concept of “faute,” which can most closely be translated as 
“fault,” equates to neither the German meaning of “intent” nor the U.S. 
definition of “negligence.”  The definitions of “faute” found in the French 
legal literature are not very informative.163  The term merely refers to any 
“abnormal behaviour” (“comportement anormal”) or “failure to do 
something that one should do.”164 
Article 1382 of the Code Civil is supplemented by Article 1383: 
“Everyone is liable for the damage he causes not only by his intentional act, 
but also by his negligent conduct or by his imprudence.”165  Here, again, the 
French meaning of negligence is much broader than the definition of the 
same term given in section 276(2) of the German BGB.  Not only is 
imprudence assimilated with negligence, but negligence in French law is 
commonly defined as a failure to behave as a “prudent man” (“un homme 
avisé”) or “a good father of a family” (“un bon père de famille”).166  This 
 
158 See C. PRO. INTELL. art. L613-4 (Fr.). 
159 See Marianne Schaffner & Alexandra Abello, LVMH c/ eBay : Une Synthèse des 
Questions Relatives à la Responsabilité des Plates-formes d’enchères, 41 REVUE LAMY 
DROIT DE L’IMMATERIEL [RLDI] 75 (2008) (Fr.). 
160 See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Sept. 27, 1996, D. 1996, 31 
(Fr.). 
161 See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1382 (Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance. 
gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070721. 
162 Id. 
163 See JOHN BELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 365 (2d ed. 2007). 
164 See JEAN-LUC AUBERT ET AL.,  DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS : 2. LE FAIT JURIDIQUE 
99 (11th ed. 2006). 
165 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1383 (Fr.). 
166 See BELL ET AL., supra note 163, at 367. 
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implies that, under Article 1383 of the Code Civil, anyone is expected to 
care for the wellbeing of others, which is far more demanding than the 
“reasonable care” required in section 276(2) of the German BGB.  Another 
difference from German law, under the French provision, account may be 
taken of the character of the individual involved.167 
Under French law, it has also been recognized that an omission equals 
“faute” in the sense of Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Code Civil, at least in 
the case where the omission is related to a duty to act,168 such as where an 
official receiver of a bankrupt company does not inform clients about the 
company’s financial situation.169  But in some French cases, even a simple 
omission without any duty of care has been found sufficient to hold the 
defendant liable in the sense of Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Civil Code,170 
though this jurisprudence is not undisputed, so it makes drawing a line 
between what is considered to be legal and illegal difficult.171 
In addition to the broad scope of Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Code 
Civil, secondary liability has been accepted by French courts under 
France’s general tort law in cases where “faute” can be established between 
the indirect infringer and the harm.172  Our analysis of the French and 
German eBay decisions173 will show how far these fundamental differences 
between French and German general tort law impact the outcome of the 
respective countries’ eBay litigation.174  Surprisingly, trademark law and 
tort liability issues have scarcely been addressed by the French courts in 
French eBay litigation; the decisions, analyzed below,175 concentrate on the 
question of a specific limitation of liability for online service providers. 
 
167 YOUNGS, supra note 126, at 366. 
168 See LAMY DROIT DE LA RESPONSABILITE 226–63 (Philippe Brun et al. eds., 2010). 
169 See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., May 10, 
2005, D. 2005, 1475, obs. A. Lienhard (Fr.). 
170 See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Feb. 
27, 1951, D. Jur. 1951, 329 (Fr.). 
171 See FRANÇOIS TERRE ET AL., DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS 721 (10th ed. 2009). 
172 See LAMY DROIT DE LA RESPONSABILITE, supra note 168, at 226–35. 
173 See infra Part III.D. 
174 In general, a comparison of the French and German Civil Codes shows that a “strong 
moral and ethical core of values runs through the [French] Code, as illustrated by Arts 6 and 
1134.” PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 66 (2d ed. 1999).  In 
contrast, the German Civil Code has been influenced by the Pandectist Movement. “[Pan-
dectist] methodology was a scientific, logical approach to the solution of legal problems.  
Law was therefore approached outside any ethical, moral or religious considerations, and, at 
least for the resolution of problems, was a mathematical process determined by a ‘conceptual 
calculus.’”  Id. at 81.  These different approaches seem to be well reflected in the French and 
German court decisions regarding eBay’s secondary liability. 
175 See infra Part III.D.2. 
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C.  Limitations on Liability of Intermediary Service Providers on the 
Internet 
In addition to the question of secondary liability for trademark 
infringements, the European eBay cases raise the question of whether an 
online service or host provider is exempt from liability because of specific 
Internet regulation. 
1.  E-Commerce Directive 2000/31 EC 
At the European Union level, liability of online service or host 
providers for illegal activity by third parties is regulated by Directive 
2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 
on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular 
Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market176 (E-Commerce Directive).  
Article 14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive states: 
[EU] Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not 
liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the 
service, on condition that: 
a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or 
information, and as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts 
or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is 
apparent; or 
b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.177 
Additionally, a court or administrative authority of a member state still has 
the ability to require the service provider “to terminate or prevent an 
infringement.”178  Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive prevents 
member states from imposing general monitoring obligations on the host 
provider.179 
The definition of “host provider” under Articles 14 and 15 of the E-
Commerce Directive has been addressed in the ECJ’s decision in Google v. 
Louis Vuitton, a dispute between Google and Louis Vuitton that was 
referred to the ECJ by the French Cour de Cassation.180  In its decision, the 
ECJ decided that Google does not use a mark in the course of trade when it 
 
176 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1. 
177 Id. art. 14(1). 
178 Id. art. 14(3). 
179 Id. art 15.  Overall, the E-Commerce Directive is generally consonant with the protec-
tion afforded in the U.S. by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–
05, 1301–32 (2010); 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2010). 
180 Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier 
SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-02417. 
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sells a mark as a keyword, stores the mark on its servers, or displays adver-
tisements on the basis thereof.  To the incidentally-raised question of 
whether Internet search engine Google must be qualified as a host provider 
according to Article 14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive, the ECJ ruled that: 
[I]n order to establish whether the liability of a referencing service 
provider may be limited under Article 14 of Directive 2000/31, it is 
necessary to examine whether the role played by that service 
provider is neutral, in the sense that its conduct is merely technical, 
automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge or control of 
the data which it stores.181 
The ECJ noted that the fact that Google gets paid for its service does 
not mean that Google takes an active role in content, but also noted that the 
role Google plays “in the drafting of the commercial message” and the 
“selection of keywords” are relevant considerations.182  Ultimately, the ECJ 
left it to the national courts to determine whether Google can be qualified as 
a “host provider” on a case-by-case basis.183  Thus, future domestic 
decisions will have to respect the ECJ’s definition as given in the Google v. 
Louis Vuitton decision, but will still have freedom in interpreting the ECJ’s 
definition on a case-by-case basis.184  Also, the ECJ’s decision in Google v. 
Louis Vuitton did not address the question of whether an online auction 
provider could benefit from the E-Commerce Directive’s Article 14(1) safe 
harbour—which so far has been left to future decisions185—nor does it 
affect the substantial differences in national trademark and tort laws, as 
presented above186 and as reflected in the variant court decisions to be 
analyzed below.187 
2.  National Law 
The EU E-Commerce Directive was transposed in Germany by the 
Telemedia Act, Telemedia Gesetz (TMG).188  The liability exemption in 
Article 14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive corresponds to section 10(1) of 
the TMG.  The ban on the imposition of a general monitoring obligation in 
 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 See id. 
185 See Case C-324/09, L’Oréal, SA v. eBay, Int’l A.G., COURT OF JUST. OF THE EUR. 
UNION (July 12, 2011), http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit 
=rechercher&numaff=C-324/09. 
186 See supra Part III.B. 
187 See infra Part III.D. 
188 Telemediengesetz [TMG] [German Act for Telemedia Services], Feb. 26, 2007, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 179 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/tmg/. 
The Liability of Online Markets for Counterfeit Goods 
32:37 (2011) 
65 
Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive is found in section 7(2) of the 
TMG.  In France, the E-Commerce Directive was transposed by the Law on 
Confidence in the Digital Economy, Loi pour la Confiance dans l’Économie 
Numérique (LCEN).189  The liability exemption in Article 14(1) of the E-
Commerce Directive corresponds to Article 6.I.2 of the LCEN.  In addition, 
Article 6.I.5 of the LCEN includes presumptions of when a provider is 
supposed to be aware of a legal infringement by a third party.  Like Article 
15 of the E-Commerce Directive, Article 6.I.7 of the LCEN exempts host 
providers from general monitoring obligations. 
Articles 6.I.7(3) and (4) of the LCEN, however, go beyond the 
specifications in the EU E-Commerce Directive and the German TMG by 
expressly requiring the host provider to actively combat the criminal 
offenses of glorifying crimes against humanity, inciting racial hatred, 
promoting child pornography, inciting violence, and violating human 
dignity.  To this end, the French law requires online service providers to 
install mechanisms on their websites that enable users to report this type of 
illegal content to the providers.190  An online service provider is then 
obliged to inform the authorities accordingly and to disclose what action it 
is taking to combat illegal activities.191  The LCEN limits its requirements 
to technical mechanisms and otherwise leaves it up to the users to report 
these illegal activities.192  It does not oblige the host provider to actively 
search for illegal activities.193  Article 15(2) of the E-Commerce Directive 
expressly permits national legislators to impose information obligations on 
online service providers.194  As Article 6.I.7 of the LCEN does not impose 
general monitoring obligations on host providers, it therefore stays within 
the framework of Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive.  In turn, Article 
6.I.4 of the LCEN stipulates fines for improper notification of content that 
is actually legal.  This prevents misuse of the regulation. 
 
189 Loi 2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 pour la confiance dans l’économie numérique [Law No. 
2004-575 of 21 June 2004 on Confidence in the Digital Economy], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 22, 2004, p. 11168 
(Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?dateTexte=&categorie 
Lien=id&cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000801164&fastPos=1&fastReqId=1859418048&oldAc
tion=rechExpTexteJorf. 
190 Id. art. 6.I.7(3)–(4). 
191 Id. 
192 See id. art. 6.I.7. 
193 See id. 
194  
Member States may establish obligations for information society service providers 
promptly to inform the competent public authorities of alleged illegal activities 
undertaken or information provided by recipients of their service or obligations to 
communicate to the competent authorities, at their request, information enabling 
the identification of recipients of their service with whom they have storage 
agreements.   
Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 15(2), 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1. 
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Although the French law transposing the E-Commerce Directive con-
tains more thorough and apparently more stringent regulations than the 
German TMG, this does not necessarily mean that German legislators 
intended to apply lower standards for protection against legal infringements 
on the Internet.  The discrepancy is due rather to the general tendency of 
French legislators towards more politically-motivated and more detailed 
regulations.  As the following analysis of the respective countries’ eBay 
rulings will show, corresponding to a general tradition in the two legal 
systems, expansion on the governing statute is left to the German courts to a 
greater degree than in France. 
D.  The European Online Auction Litigation 
1.  Germany 
In Germany, there is both well-developed Bundesgerichtshof case law 
on the liability of online markets for secondary trademark infringement as 
well as extensive additional commenting literature on the subject.195  To 
date, three cases have been presented to the BGH, giving the court the 
opportunity to refine its own ruling from case to case: Internet-
Versteigerung I–III (Internet Auction Decisions I–III).196  As the two later 
decisions confirm and supplement the first decision, we will not consider 
them separately but will analyze them together. 
All three cases were brought by the prominent luxury watch 
manufacturer Rolex SA (Rolex).  The Internet-Versteigerung I case was 
against the online marketplace Ricardo, which now no longer provides 
services to the German market, but still operates in Switzerland, Denmark, 
Greece, and some other countries, using a business model similar to 
eBay.197  The Internet-Versteigerung II and Internet-Versteigerung III cases 
were against eBay.  The facts in these cases were very similar to the Tiffany 
v. eBay litigation.  Plaintiff Rolex owns international and nationally-
registered trademarks, which consist of the word “Rolex” and the famous 
logo of a five-pointed crown, as well as the names of its individual models 
of watches.198  As in the Tiffany v. eBay litigation, counterfeit Rolex 
 
195 See, e.g., Stefan Leible & Olaf Sosnitza, Haftung von Internetauktionshäusern—
Reloaded, 60 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3324 (2007) (Ger.); Thomas Wil-
mer, Überspannte Pflichten für Host-Provider—Vorschlag für eine Haftungsmatrix, 61 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1845 (2008) (Ger.). 
196 158 BGHZ 236 (Ger.) (Internet-Versteigerung I); 172 BGHZ 119 (Ger.) (Internet-
Versteigerung II); MMR 531, 2008 (Ger.) (Internet-Versteigerung III). 
197 See Übersicht, RICARDO.CH, http://www.ricardo.ch/pages/start/de.php (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2011). 
198 While the second case Internet-Versteigerung II was pending, several watch models 
had also been registered as European Community Trade Marks in addition to the national 
and international trademarks, which raised some additional legal problems.  See 172 BGHZ 
119 (124–25) (Ger.).  It would go beyond the scope of this article to discuss them here. 
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watches had been sold between individual buyers and sellers on the Ricardo 
and eBay auction sites at prices far below those for genuine Rolex products.  
In some cases, those counterfeit watches had been expressly designated as 
“imitations” or “replica.”  Rolex sought injunctive relief against the online 
marketplaces, to stop the sale of counterfeit Rolex products on the 
defendants’ websites, and claimed damages for trademark infringement.199 
The German BGH in all three decisions examined direct and secondary 
trademark infringement by the defendants, general tort liability on the part 
of Ricardo and eBay, and limitation of liability for the online marketplaces; 
the court also incidentally addressed trademark infringement by the 
individual sellers of the counterfeit goods.200  As far as the direct individual 
seller is concerned, the BGH, without going into details, assumed that the 
sale of counterfeit Rolex watches constituted trademark infringements 
according to section 14(2) number 1 and section 14(3) number 2 of the 
MarkenG.201  The court pointed out that even if the watches were sold at a 
low price and marked as imitations, in a way that the individual buyer could 
have known that the watches were counterfeit and not genuine products, 
there was trademark infringement.202  Following the European Court of 
Justice decision in Arsenal Football Club v. Reed,203 the BGH stated that 
sections 14(2) and 14(3) of the MarkenG do not require an actual showing 
of confusion by the public in a specific case; the court considered the 
abstract likelihood of confusion between the genuine and the imitated 
marks on the part of the public to be sufficient.204 
The court also found that the marks had been “used in trade,” as 
required by sections 14(2) and 14(3) of the MarkenG, because, at a 
minimum, two of the sellers of the counterfeit Rolex products had eBay 
feedback scores of 26 and 75, respectively, which, according to the BGH, 
indicates more than private activity.205  The court pointed out that, although 
the requirements for meeting the “use in trade” standard are low, the “use in 
trade” criterion is not fulfilled when a private seller offers a single good on 
an online marketplace.206  The lower court had previously found the fact 
that a seller on an online marketplace tries to reach a multitude of potential 
 
199 See Landgericht Köln [LG Köln] [regional court of Köln] Oct. 31, 2000, INTERNET-
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSINFORMATIK [JURPC] 81, 2001 (Ger.); Landgericht Düsseldorf [LG 
Düsseldorf] [regional court of Düsseldorf] Oct. 29, 2002, INTERNET-ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
RECHTSINFORMATIK [JURPC] 11, 2003 (Ger.). 
200 See 158 BGHZ 236 (246–52) (Ger.). 
201 See id. at 246; see also MMR 531 (533), 2008 (Ger.). 
202 See 158 BGHZ 236 (250–52) (Ger.). 
203 Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v Matthew Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-10273. 
204 See 158 BGHZ 236 (250–52) (Ger.). 
205 See MMR 531 (532), 2008 (Ger.). 
206 See id.  For a detailed discussion, see Cornelis Lement, Zur Haftung von Internet-
Auktionshäusern – Anmerkung zum Urteil des BGH “Internetversteigerung,” 107 
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 210, 213–14 (2005) (Ger.). 
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buyers in order to reach the highest price possible sufficient to satisfy the 
“use in trade” criterion.207  To the BGH, this rule would have meant a 
boundless expansion of the criterion “use in trade.”208  It therefore required 
that the sale take part within the framework of a commercial activity, rather 
than an occasional private sale.209  The BGH is probably right with this 
interpretation, but, as the situation implicates Article 5 of the EU Trade 
Marks Directive, it is regrettable that the court did not refer the question to 
the European Court of Justice.210 
As far as a host provider is concerned, until now the BGH has 
dismissed all claims against host providers based on arguments of direct 
trademark infringement.  In the Rolex litigation, the BGH, without even 
discussing this issue, found that the operators of the online auction sites did 
not themselves offer the counterfeit products, put them into circulation, or 
use them in advertising, and were therefore not liable for direct 
infringement.211 
In terms of contributory trademark infringement, which was at the 
heart of the Tiffany v. eBay case, the BGH did not find such secondary 
liability in the Internet-Versteigerung cases due to lack of intent.212  
Overall, the BGH came to the same result as the U.S. courts under the 
Inwood test—that is, no secondary liability because of lack of intent, as 
eBay had only general knowledge of trademark infringement being 
committed by users of its auction site.213  The reasoning of the BGH, 
though, is relatively sparse compared to that of the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  The BGH reiterated the German definition of intent, which 
requires “knowing and desiring the elements of the definition which 
constitutes the tort.”214  According to the BGH, the defendants lacked this 
“knowledge” because the offers for sale of the counterfeit goods that 
appeared on the auction sites had been placed online using an automatic 
process without the prior knowledge of the site operators.215  The fact that 
an operator may expect occasional trademark infringement was immaterial 
to the court, which focused on the fact that vicarious intent must relate to a 
principal offense that is actually imminent.216 
 
207 Oberlandesgericht Köln [OLG Köln] [higher regional court of Köln] Nov. 2, 2001, 
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The German court did not explain its rationale for this aspect of its de-
cision, in contrast to the detail the U.S. courts put in explaining why eBay’s 
generalized knowledge did not impose an affirmative duty to remove coun-
terfeit Tiffany jewelry from its auction site.217  The reason that the BGH 
paid so little attention to the question of generalized knowledge of in-
fringement is probably because the court considered the German concept of 
Störerhaftung disquietor liability, as developed by the German courts under 
sections 823(1) and 1004 of the BGB,218 appropriate for deciding the cases 
before it.  As discussed above, disquietor liability can be found independent 
from fault and gives a right of injunctive relief instead of damages.219  It is 
worth noting that some aspects mentioned by the U.S. courts under the In-
wood test can be found in the BGH’s reasoning in finding disquietor liabil-
ity.  The German court also pointed out that it considered the concept of 
disquietor liability as an appropriate means to comply with the EU En-
forcement Directive in German law, and therefore examined the conditions 
for granting an injunction against the defendants as a matter of domestic 
law according to Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive.220 
With respect to its disquietor liability findings, the BGH first reiterated 
the conditions of disquietor liability.  As discussed, a disquietor is anyone 
who—without being an infringer or a participant—contributes causally, 
wilfully and in any adequate way to the infringement of a protected right221 
and is in a position to prevent such infringement.222  The BGH 
acknowledged that there had been direct trademark infringement by the 
individual sellers on the defendant’s auction sites.223  It is unclear, though, 
whether the BGH would base a decision against host providers on direct or 
secondary (indirect) disquietor liability or on an action/omission.  The latter 
would require a duty of care.  To us, the most appropriate choice would be 
to tie any liability of eBay and other online marketplaces to the provision 
and maintenance of the Internet auction sites which make the direct 
trademark infringement committed by users possible. Thus, eBay and other 
marketplaces would, if anything, be considered indirect disquietors.224 
In order not to unduly extend disquietor liability to third parties who 
have not actually made any unlawful contribution to infringement of a 
protected right, German jurisprudence, in the area of intellectual property 
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law and in the case of secondary disquietor liability, typically requires a vi-
violation of monitoring obligations for liability to be found.225  Violation of 
monitoring obligations is also a requirement for finding liability in the case 
of an active contribution.226  Thus, active contribution and omission are 
treated equally.  The nature and degree of such monitoring obligations are 
determined by what, given the specific circumstances of the case, is 
technically and economically possible and can be reasonably expected from 
the person owing the obligations.227  Therefore, further discussion by the 
BGH in its disquietor liability findings focused on the scope of Ricardo’s 
and eBay’s monitoring obligations, and the court’s efforts to find a 
compromise between the trademark owner and the online auctioneer.228 
The court considered it unreasonable “to monitor every offer for 
potential infringement prior to publication on the Internet.”229  The judges 
pointed out that such an obligation would challenge the “whole business 
model” of the operator of an online auction platform and run counter to the 
E-Commerce Directive.230  On the other hand, the BGH brought into play 
the fact that since “the operator participates in the sale of the pirated goods 
through the fee payable, its interest in the smoothest possible operation of 
its business is less important than for example the interest of a domain name 
registration office in allocating domains as quickly and cheaply as 
possible.”231  Thus, the court stated that the operator of an online 
marketplace, whenever informed of an obvious infringement, “must not 
only immediately disable access to the actual offer, but also take 
precautions to ensure that as far as possible no further similar trademark 
infringements (with core similarities) occur.”232  Pursuant to this so-called 
core theory, the BGH requires the operator, on being informed of an 
obvious trademark infringement, to take steps to subject “in core similar” 
offers to special scrutiny.  In other words, the BGH does not consider it 
sufficient for the provider to look for identical infringements in existing 
online offerings, but requires it also to check new offers, using a preferred 
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filter, and to delete infringing offers as necessary.233  How the filter system 
should work in practice depends, among other things, on what is technically 
feasible and reasonable.234 
Under the terms of Article 14(1) of the EU E-Commerce Directive, 
codified in German law at section 10(1) of the TMG, a host provider is not 
liable for information stored at the request of the recipient of the service.235  
To benefit from this liability exemption, Internet auction sites must be host 
providers within the meaning of these regulations.  Unlike the French 
courts, the BGH did not go into an extensive discussion of eBay’s status as 
a host provider.236  It basically assumed that the liability exemption referred 
to in Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive, and in sections 8 to 10 of the 
TMG, applied to Ricardo and eBay because the auction sites’ offers had 
been placed online using an automatic process.237 
According to Article 14(3) of the E-Commerce Directive, codified in 
German law at section 7(2) of the TMG, however, 
This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or 
administrative authority, in accordance with Member States’ legal 
systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an 
infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States of 
establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling of access 
to information.238 
Thus, based on Article 14(3), the BGH ruled that the limitation of liability 
provided for in Article 14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive did not apply to 
injunctive relief but to damages claims only.239 
a. Implications and Aftermath of the Internet-Versteigerung I–III Decisions 
Each of the three Internet-Versteigerung decisions confirms and 
supplements the precedent decisions, without substantively changing them.  
Thus, it appears that there is now a stable jurisprudence in Germany on 
secondary liability of online markets for the sale of counterfeit goods.  
From a business perspective, however, the criteria used by the 
Bundesgerichtshof are unclear and not precise enough, leaving room for 
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different interpretations.  Therefore, the BGH’s decisions actually create 
uncertainty and make it hard to predict under what circumstances an online 
service or host provider may actually be liable.  It is likewise unclear what, 
if anything, a host provider must do in order to efficiently limit its potential 
liability in connection with illegal activities of custumers using its website. 
In essence, the BGH clearly dismisses Rolex’s claims for damages 
based on a direct or indirect trademark infringement for lack of fault,240 but 
the court also imposes on the online auction provider obligations to 
monitor, detect, and prevent future trademark infringements by third 
parties.241  A prerequisite for these monitoring obligations is that the 
trademark infringements need to be obvious and similar to those known to 
the online auction provider.242  What is considered to be an “obvious” 
violation of protected rights remains unclear.  For sure, after receiving 
notice by a trademark owner, the online auctioneer must check the allegedly 
counterfeit article and, in the case of an actual infringement, must remove 
the counterfeit article from the auction.243  But, the BGH extends this 
obligation to “in core” similar infringements.244  Thus, according to the 
German court, it is not enough to search for the same infringement after 
having received notice; the Internet auction operator needs to also actively 
search for “in core” similar counterfeit products and remove them from the 
auction site.245  In other words, after receiving notice of a particular 
counterfeit item, eBay is required to filter any identical and similar 
products, either currently offered or listed in the future, from its auction 
website.  The BGH does not instruct as to whether the online service or host 
provider only needs to filter illegal products or if it also needs to monitor 
suspicious sellers.246 
As far as their scope is concerned, the monitoring obligations need to 
be reasonable and technically feasible.  In its recent decision 
Kinderhochstühle im Internet,247 which confirmed the Internet-
Versteigerung I–III decisions, the BGH specifies that the online service 
provider has an obligation to technically filter and to effectively manually 
control suspicious offers, but the online service provider need not manually 
search for trademark infringements that the technical filter program was 
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unable to detect.248 
What is considered to be reasonable and technically feasible depends 
on the factual circumstances of the individual case, in particular the 
importance of the protected right and the economic considerations,249 the 
facts of which will all be evaluated by the deciding judge.  Technical 
feasibility may change depending on the degree of technical and 
technological development.  Thus, in the Internet Versteigerung I – III 
rulings, the BGH did not reach any firm conclusions or set any firm 
standards, thereby deferring the ultimate finding until the enforcement 
proceedings of each individual case.250  This, added to the already 
complicated prerequisites of disquietor liability, makes it difficult for the 
online service provider to know what exactly he is expected to do to avoid 
liability. 
In addition to this uncertainty about how to apply the rulings of the 
BGH in practice, there is also some larger-scale legal uncertainty.  The 
BGH decisions raise several unsolved issues related to EU law, such as the 
definition of “host provider” under Articles 14 and 15 of the E-Commerce 
Directive.251  This question, though not decisive for the BGH cases, has 
partly been answered by the European Court of Justice in its Google v. 
Louis Vuitton decision.252  It will be interesting to observe the degree to 
which the ECJ’s ruling in Google v. Louis Vuitton will influence the BGH’s 
future decisions on host provider liability. 
Still, the ECJ’s Google v. Louis Vuitton decision does not answer the 
ultimately decisive question in the German Internet-Versteigerung cases.  
That is, whether the ban on the imposition of general monitoring 
obligations under Article 7(2) of the TMG (Article 15 of the E-Commerce 
Directive) applies to injunctive relief.253  Because the German decision 
imposes extensive monitoring obligations on eBay, this question is of 
extreme importance for the outcome of the German cases.  In addition, the 
issue is extremely contentious in German literature.254  Unfortunately, the 
BGH did not submit this question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling—
although it was actually obliged to do so, as a court of last instance, under 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.255 
Another open legal question is the influence of Article 11 of the EU 
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Enforcement Directive256 concerning the scope of injunctive relief granted 
by national law.257  As the injunctive relief in the form of the German 
disquietor liability is at the heart of the German decisions against eBay, the 
decision of the ECJ in the case referred to it by the High Court of England 
and Wales, L’Oréal SA v. eBay International AG,258 should significantly 
impact future decisions in Germany.  The ECJ held in that case: 
Article 11 of [Enforcement] Directive must be interpreted as 
requiring the Member States to ensure that the national courts with 
jurisdiction in relation to the protection of intellectual property rights 
are able to order the operator of an online marketplace to take 
measures which contribute, not only to bringing to an end 
infringements of those rights by users of that marketplace, but also to 
preventing further infringements of that kind.  Those injunctions 
must be effective, proportionate, dissuasive and must not create 
barriers to legitimate trade.259 
Also, recent BGH jurisprudence in the area of competition law might 
indicate a new trend in German jurisprudence.  In a decision concerning the 
sale of video games, DVDs, etc.—which were considered to be dangerous 
for young people—on eBay,260 the BGH had qualified eBay as a direct 
violator of competition rules according to sections 3 and 2(1) number 1 of 
the German Act Against Unfair Competition, Gesetz gegen unlauteren 
Wettbewerb (UWG).261  It has been argued that this ruling might impact 
future decisions regarding the liability of online service providers for 
trademark infringements by third parties.262  According to the current 
rulings of the BGH, and probably confirmed by the ECJ’s Google v. Louis 
Vuitton decision, as a direct violator, eBay would also be exempt from 
liability according to Article 14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive.263 
Finally, because the German decisions seem to be tailored to 
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secondary trademark infringement, it would not be appropriate to draw con-
conclusions from these decisions to the secondary liability of host providers 
for violations of other rights.  In the case of an Internet opinion forum, for 
example, extensive monitoring obligations probably would constitute a 
violation of freedom of speech, which, as a fundamental right, is also 
protected under the German constitution. 
2.  France 
While the German eBay and Ricardo litigation has remained fairly 
unnoticed in the U.S. and other non-German-speaking countries,264 some of 
the French eBay decisions have caused stir on both sides of the Atlantic, 
and not only because of the glamorous names involved.  Namely, the 
decisions in the SA Louis Vuitton Malletier v. eBay Inc., Christian Dior 
Couture, SA v. eBay Inc., and SA Parfums Christian Dior v. eBay Inc. 
(collectively LVMH v. eBay)265 and the Hermès International v. Cindy F 
(Hermès v. eBay)266 cases have been extensively commented on outside of 
France, including in U.S. law reviews.267  These decisions not only entitled 
the respective trademark owners to injunctive relief, as in the German 
decisions discussed above, but awarded damages to the plaintiffs:  €38.6 
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million (approximately $60.8 million) to LVMH Moët Hennessy • Louis 
Vuitton S.A. (LVMH)268 and €20,000 (approximately $31,000) to Hermès 
International S.A. (Hermès).269  Another decision, S.A. L’Oréal v. S.A. eBay 
France (L’Oréal v. eBay),270 seems to have garnered far less international 
attention, but is interesting on several fronts.  Based on similar facts, but 
ultimately dismissing L’Oréal S.A.’s (L’Oréal’s) claims, the court in this 
decision takes a much more nuanced position on the question of who should 
be responsible for monitoring trademark infringements on the Internet, and 
suggests mediation as a possible new method of dispute resolution between 
trademark holders and online service providers.271  Most recently, two 
decisions, on appeal from Hermès v. eBay and LVMH v. eBay, though 
moderating the LVMH v. eBay decision by significantly reducing the 
amount of damages awarded to LVMH, seem to confirm the original 
French position.272  It should be noted, though, that even the recent court of 
appeal decisions are lower court decisions, without any binding effect on 
French trial or other courts of appeal.  In fact, because France is a civil law 
country, even a decision from the highest court of ordinary jurisdiction, the 
Cour de Cassation, would not be binding—though practically speaking, 
such a Cour de Cassation decision will usually de facto be respected by 
lower courts, and therefore would provide more clarity about the liability of 
online marketplaces for secondary trademark infringements in France. 
The facts of the French cases were very similar to Tiffany v. eBay.  In 
Hermès v. eBay, following receipt of a report of counterfeit merchandise 
purchased by a buyer of a Hermès Birken handbag and accessories on eBay, 
Hermès brought suit in the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Troyes, seeking 
to hold eBay liable for facilitating and participating jointly in acts of 
trademark infringement with the seller of two counterfeit Hermès handbags 
on eBay’s auction site. 273  In LVMH v. eBay, after discovering that 
substantial quantities of counterfeit merchandise were being sold on eBay, 
French conglomerate of luxury trademarks LVMH contacted eBay in an 
effort to curtail the sale of such items.274  Like Tiffany and Rolex, LVMH 
remained unsatisfied with eBay’s efforts to remedy the counterfeiting 
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problem and filed suit in the Tribunal de Commerce de Paris against eBay 
for contributory trademark infringement.  LVMH claimed that eBay had 
facilitated the marketing and sale of counterfeit LVMH products on its 
website and continued to do so after having been notified by the plaintiff.275  
Though the LVMH litigation consists of three individual claims, we will 
concentrate on the first two judgments, as they are based on identical 
considerations and concentrate on secondary liability for trademark 
infringement.276  Finally, in L’Oréal v. eBay, French cosmetic group 
L’Oréal had brought suit against eBay in the Tribunal de Grande Instance 
de Paris, claiming damages and injunctive relief for the sale of several 
counterfeit perfumes on eBay’s auction site.277 
Contrary to the U.S. and German cases, which concentrate on the legal 
questions related to secondary trademark infringement278 or general tort 
liability,279 the French cases concentrate on the question of whether eBay is 
a host provider and therefore free to enjoy a limitation of liability under 
Article 14(1) of the EU E-Commerce Directive, codified in French law at 
Article 6.I.2 of the LCEN.280  This, in our opinion, is problematic because 
before liability can be limited, a standard for finding liability must first be 
established.281  Therefore, in the following, we will first analyze the cause 
of action used by each French court in its decision against eBay, though—at 
least in the trial court decisions—it is not always clearly expressed.  We 
will then present the discussion of liability exemption for host providers as 
argued by the French courts. 
The decision of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Troyes,282 
confirmed by the Cour d’Appel de Reims,283 in Hermès v. eBay was based 
on Article L713-2 of the CPI.284  Nowhere did the French courts deciding 
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Hermès v. eBay discuss secondary trademark infringement, which was ap-
appropriate, as Articles L713-2 and L713-3 of the CPI concern direct in-
infringement only.  Unlike German statutory trademark law in section 14(4) 
of the MarkenG, French intellectual property law does expressively regulate 
contributory liability, but for patents only.285  As previously mentioned, we 
have found no evidence in French jurisprudence or literature which justifies 
extending secondary liability to trademarks, when such liability is not 
expressly regulated under statute—a finding that is enhanced by the fact 
that express regulation of secondary liability in the patent, but not 
trademark, context, which suggests that French lawmakers did not intend to 
regulate or impose secondary liability for trademarks.286 
According to the courts deciding Hermès, eBay was responsible for 
direct trademark infringement because it did not comply with its obligation 
to ensure that no one used its website illegally.287  Thus, in contrast to the 
U.S. courts,288 the French courts found eBay’s VeRO program to be 
insufficient, because “counterfeiters adapt themselves to the detection 
procedures simply by confirming the authenticity of their goods in the 
good’s description.”289  According to the Tribunal de Grande Instance de 
Troyes, “eBay should instead [have used] all means to force sellers to 
extensively identify the items put up for sale with detailed information such 
as the product code, serial number, type indication, authenticity certificate, 
etc.”290 
Where this obligation is grounded legally remains unclear.  The 
concept of duty of care, which in German law even assimilates an omission 
into an active infringement, does not exist in French law.  Moreover, it is 
not clear what would have justified such a duty of care in Hermès v. eBay.  
If eBay’s business were somehow dangerous, a duty of care would be 
created, but eBay’s activity most likely cannot itself be considered 
dangerous.  Apparently, the French courts had in mind an obligation for a 
host provider to do its best in order to prevent any possible harm that 
emanates from its website.  This is a concept that exists in French tort law 
under Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Code Civil.291  Nevertheless, in its 
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decision the courts did not examine the common law of torts.292  Moreover, 
under Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Code Civil, eBay’s liability would 
have been dependant on fault,293 which was not addressed in the Hermès 
decisions either.  In sum, the French decisions in Hermès v. eBay seem to 
fail in addressing several important issues, and it will be interesting to learn 
the opinion of the Cour de Cassation on these questions. 
Having established—supposedly—eBay’s liability for facilitating and 
participating in acts of trademark infringement, the central question 
examined by the French courts in Hermès was whether eBay was a host 
provider, in the sense of Article 6.I.2 of the LCEN and Article 14(1) of the 
E-Commerce Directive, such that it could thereby be exempted from civil 
liability for simply storing the information of third parties. 
The Tribunal de Grande Instance de Troyes found that eBay was 
indeed inherently a host provider within the meaning of Article 6.I.2 of the 
LCEN and Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive, since eBay only stored 
on its auction site information, which had been placed online by its 
customers, without having any influence on its content.294  However, 
according to the court, the business of eBay’s online site went beyond that 
of a typical host provider, since eBay set up the auction website, established 
auction rules, and provided the recipients of its service with the tools to 
present their goods attractively.295  To this extent, eBay acted not only as a 
host provider but simultaneously as an online auctioneer.  In contrast to if 
eBay’s role had purely been that of a technical host provider, eBay could 
not qualify for limitation of liability because of its direct engagement in 
commercial activity related to the site.296  As such, according to the court, it 
was incumbent upon eBay to ensure that its service was not misused for 
illegal purposes and, to the extent that eBay failed to do so, it could not call 
on the liability exemption reserved for pure host providers.297 
This reasoning was fully confirmed on appeal.298  In the meantime, the 
ECJ had issued its decision in Google v. Louis Vuitton, so the Cour d’Appel 
de Reims added a second line of reasoning by reiterating the ECJ’s 
definition of host provider as a service provider that is “neutral, in the sense 
that its conduct is merely technical, automatic and passive, pointing to a 
lack of knowledge or control of the data which it stores.”299  According to 
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the court of appeals, eBay had played an active role in the sale of the coun-
counterfeit goods by providing marketing tools, dispute settlement 
procedures, and payment services to the third party seller and his or her 
customers.300  eBay had also, the court found, encouraged sales by 
providing links to similar offers of counterfeit products.301  Therefore, the 
court held, eBay could not benefit from the host provider safe harbour 
privilege.302  Under general trademark law, the court required eBay to make 
sure that no counterfeit items were sold on its auction site.303  Unlike the 
German and U.S. courts, who dismissed an Internet auction site operator’s 
general knowledge of trademark infringement by third parties as 
insufficient, and required specific knowledge,304 the Cour d’Appel not only 
held a generalized knowledge sufficient, but considered eBay to be “all the 
more punishable since eBay knew that not all Hermès products sold on its 
site are genuine goods.”305 
In the case of LVMH v. eBay, the Tribunal de Commerce de Paris306 
and the Cour d’Appel de Paris307 based their decisions addressing LVMH’s 
claims for injunctive relief and damages on common French tort liability, 
specifically Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Code Civil.308  This is because 
trademark claims can only be filed with the civil courts, not the commercial 
courts.309  As discussed above, Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Code Civil are 
extremely comprehensive and require anyone who has contributed to 
harming someone in any way to rectify the damage caused.310 
Apart from the different cause of action, the reasoning of the court in 
LVMH v. eBay is very similar to the decision in Hermès.  By providing 
online auction services to its customers, the Tribunal de Commerce de Paris 
stated, eBay had significantly assisted in the sale and marketing of 
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counterfeit products by third parties and had, therefore, infringed a legal 
right of the plaintiff.311  According to the court, eBay had not fulfilled its 
obligation to ensure that its business did not give rise to any illegal activity 
to the detriment of other companies, and therefore acted with fault 
according to Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Code Civil.312  The court found 
that the trademark infringements had been obvious to eBay given the 
descriptions used in the listings, such as “imitation” and “replica,” as well 
as the quantities sold and the low prices offered by the sellers.313 
Therefore, the Tribunal de Commerce de Paris stated, eBay was 
subject to a general monitoring obligation, and eBay’s liability was all the 
greater since it had refused to use effective means to combat trademark 
infringements, such as by compelling sellers to submit a receipt or 
certificate of authenticity or by closing a user’s account the first time the 
user made an illegal offer of sale.314  With regard to eBay’s VeRO program, 
the court did qualify it as an effective measure to limit the sale of 
counterfeit products on its website, but also as an effort to mitigate the 
effects of its past negligence and therefore represented an acknowledgement 
of eBay’s fault.315  Thus, the court ordered eBay to pay damages on the 
grounds of negligence and serious omissions.316  Similar to the ruling in 
Hermès v. eBay, the Tribunal de Commerce de Paris in LVMH v. eBay also 
refused to qualify eBay as a host provider and, therefore, denied limitation 
of liability under Article 6.I.2 of the LCEN and Article 14 of the E-
Commerce Directive, as eBay had acted not only as a host provider but 
simultaneously as an online auctioneer.317 
The view of the Tribunal de Commerce de Paris in LVMH v. eBay was 
confirmed by the Cour d’Appel de Paris in its decisions rendered on 
appeal.318  The appellate court confirmed eBay’s obligation to control its 
site and ensure that the goods sold on its auction platform are genuine 
goods.319  How eBay should do this, given the fact that eBay never actually 
possesses the goods sold on its site, remains unclear.  In any case, the court 
set very high standards of compliance concerning eBay’s filter program, 
requiring that eBay conduct active searches and demanding that eBay 
remove counterfeit products immediately upon receiving notice from rights 
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owners.320  The court found that, based on the underlying facts at the time 
the LVMH dispute arose, eBay had not satisfied the requirement, or at least 
had not sufficiently proven, that its trademark owner’s rights protection 
measures lived up to these standards.321  Actually, it is this part of the 
decision on appeal which might offer some hope for eBay and other online 
service providers in France.  Given that since the beginning of the LVMH 
litigation, eBay has made significant progress in its owner rights protection 
efforts,322 the court may come to a different finding in future cases. 
Regarding eBay’s status as a host provider the court reiterated the 
ECJ’s definition.323  Though the outcome is the same as that in Hermès v. 
eBay, the rationale of the Cour d’Appel de Paris is slightly different from 
that of the Cour d’Appel de Reims.  The Cour d’Appel de Paris makes clear 
that eBay’s business cannot be divided into two separate activities, one of 
providing a technical hosting service, the other one of offering a 
commercial online auction service.324  According to the court, the hosting 
activity is only a technical means necessary for eBay’s overall business 
activity, which is online auctioneering.325  In running its business, the court 
found, eBay did not simply classify or facilitate access to sales offers stored 
by third parties, but also offered marketing tools, links, and other services to 
its customers.326  Thus, according to the Cour d’Appel de Paris, eBay 
actively promoted and financially benefited from the sale of counterfeit 
products on its site.327  The court held that eBay’s role was not limited to 
that of a neutral technical host provider, eBay had control over the 
information stored on its servers, and, therefore, eBay was obliged to 
monitor the sales of third parties on its auction site.328 
In the case of L’Oréal v. eBay, the Tribunal de Grande Instance de 
Paris, unlike the other French trial courts discussed, makes passing 
reference to trademark law in its decision, but without specifying any 
relevant articles of the CPI or examining its conditions.329  The ruling gives 
the impression that the court wanted to rely directly on Article 6.I.2 of the 
LCEN and Article 14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive as the principle basis 
of L’Oréal’s claim.330  The court held that “online service providers are 
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inherently liable under the general principles of tort, unless it is proved that 
their businesses are carried on within the context of the specific liability 
system of the [E-Commerce] Directive and its transposition into French 
law.”331 
Whether this interpretation is in keeping with the intentions of the E-
Commerce Directive appears doubtful.332  In this respect, the ECJ should 
have clarified whether Article 14(1) of the Directive is a standard on 
limitation of liability, as defined by German BGH case law, or a special 
liability regime that could be used directly to substantiate liability.  But, the 
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, like the BGH, decided not to refer 
this question to the European Court of Justice.333  It has to be mentioned, 
though, that unlike the BGH which, as a court of last instance, was obliged 
to refer a question on the interpretation of EU law to the European Court of 
Justice,334 the Tribunal de Grande Instance, as a lower court of law, has a 
right, not an obligation, of submission to the ECJ.335 
The ruling in L’Oréal v. eBay raises a further question, however, as yet 
unanswered by French case law, concerning the apportionment of the 
burden of proving that the requirements of Article 6.I.2 of the LCEN and 
Article 14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive have been fulfilled.  As a claim 
requirement, this should logically fall to the plaintiff.  In stark contrast to 
the decisions in Hermès v. eBay and LVMH v. eBay, the Tribunal de Grande 
Instance in L’Oréal v. eBay allowed eBay the benefit of the liability 
exemption for host providers.336  The court reasoned that the expansion of 
the Internet and the complexity of e-commerce make it impossible to 
distinguish between the “main and secondary businesses” of a host 
provider, as done by the previous French decisions; therefore, the court 
said, the online service provider must be granted liability exemption for 
both activities in accordance with Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive, 
even for a commercial activity.337  Thus, the court rejected L’Oréal’s claim 
against eBay for trademark liability in connection with the sale of 
counterfeit goods by the site’s users.338 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris imposed the 
following limitation, which must be complied with in the future: 
[L]iability exemption shall only apply to the extent that eBay’s 
activities are restricted to storing the information provided by users 
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of its service and to placing their offers on the Web.  Advertising 
over and above this, and other commercial activities intended to 
assist sales but which are not vital for an online auction site shall 
continue not to qualify for liability exemption.339 
The court clearly stated that, for example, advertising or commercial 
links to the eBay portal, as well as headings like “Favorites,” are excluded 
from liability exemption.340  It is worth noting here that a comparison of the 
French eBay portal with other countries’ eBay portals clearly shows how 
eBay has adjusted to France’s distinct national case law:  today, the French 
website “eBay.fr” looks extremely plain in comparison to other national 
eBay websites. 
Having established eBay’s status as a host provider, the court 
examined eBay’s knowledge of trademark infringements by its users 
according to Article 6.1.2 of the LCEN, which states that a service provider 
is not liable for information stored at the request of a recipient of the 
service, provided that: 
a) [T]he provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal business 
or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of 
facts or circumstances from which the illegal business or information 
is apparent; or 
b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove or disable access to the information.341 
This transposition by France of the E-Commerce Directive differs from 
Germany’s TMG in that Article 6.I.5 of the LCEN lists detailed 
requirements—including dated notification of actual infringements, with 
precise details of the source—which must be satisfied to achieve a 
presumption that the host provider had knowledge of a legal infringement.  
In the case of L’Oréal v. eBay, the allegation that a presumed offense had 
occurred was dismissed, as the letter sent by L’Oréal to eBay contained 
general information on the infringement of the plaintiff’s trademarks, but 
did not list individual specific adverts as formally required by the LCEN.342 
The remainder of the ruling in L’Oréal v. eBay is surprising.  The court 
did not examine how else eBay could have obtained knowledge of the 
infringements on its website or whether eBay immediately took action to 
remove or disable access to the illegal information, as required by Article 
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6.I.2 of the LCEN and Article 14(1)(b) of the E-Commerce Directive, but 
dismissed L’Oréal’s claim for damages against eBay.343  Very different 
from the previous French decisions, the court acknowledged that eBay “had 
entered into negotiation on the measures to be taken to improve the existing 
situation but those talks were broken unilaterally by L’Oréal who chose 
legal action.”344 
Instead of definitively deciding the case, however, the court proposed 
that “in order to achieve effective trademark protection on the Internet, 
close collaboration is necessary between the online service provider and the 
trademark owner.”345  On these grounds the court suspended the 
proceedings and recommended that the parties resolve the dispute amicably 
through mediation,346 a possibility expressly set out in the French Code of 
Civil Procedure.347  However, a mediation process between the parties prior 
to the lawsuit had already failed, suggesting slim prospects of success for a 
further mediation attempt; this was confirmed with the filing, despite its 
prior agreement to the mediation proceedings,348 of an appeal by L’Oréal 
shortly after the court made its ruling.349 
a.  Implications and Aftermath of the French eBay Litigation 
After these cases, the liability of online auction sites for trademark 
infringement and online service providers in general in France is far less 
clear than some commentaries on the French eBay litigation would 
suggest.350  Hermès v. eBay and LVMH v. eBay are only two decisions in a 
series of sometimes contradictory decisions, mostly decided by lower 
courts, related to the responsibility of online service or host providers for 
illegal acts of third parties in France.  Concerning the statutory conditions 
of secondary liability for trademark infringement, the French eBay 
decisions leave many questions open such that, for now, it is impossible to 
determine a clear position. 
None of the French decisions analyzed here examined the criterion 
“use in trade” in Article 5(1) of the EU Trade Marks Directive, which had 
been argued extensively in the Bundesgerichtshof decisions Internet-
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Versteigerung II and Internet-Versteigerung III.351  At least, for Hermès v. 
eBay, it seems to us that the sale of two counterfeit handbags does not 
necessarily meet the condition set up by the Trade Marks Directive. 
As far as the question of eBay’s legal status as a host provider, 
ultimately leading to limitation of liability, is concerned, French case law 
has been highly inconsistent.  In contrast to Hermès v. eBay and LVMH v. 
eBay, some rulings from 2007–2008, which did not concern online auction 
sites but other online service providers, issued a guideline stating that 
anyone who is not an “editor” (“éditeur”)—i.e., one who would be able to 
influence the content of the information placed online by recipients of the 
service—is classified as a host provider, and therefore qualifies for liability 
exemption.352  This argument was confirmed after the publication of the 
French eBay decisions by a ruling of the Cour d’Appel de Paris in a lawsuit 
against Daily Motion in connection with video streaming.353  The two court 
of appeal decisions in LVMH v. eBay and Hermès v. eBay, though, still lean 
towards denying eBay host provider status. 
Despite this jumble of contradictory rulings, with respect to trademark 
infringements in France on auction sites, the following “trends” can be 
identified.  First, French courts seem to be far more favorable to trademark 
owners than the U.S. courts in Tiffany v. eBay and the German courts in the 
Rolex litigation.  LVMH v. eBay and Hermès v. eBay put the entire burden 
of identifying and combating trademark infringements on eBay’s auction 
site upon eBay.  The courts in LVMH v. eBay did not even require LVMH 
to take part in eBay’s VeRO program.  Following LVMH v. eBay and 
Hermès v. eBay, eBay must, in a nutshell, do everything technically 
possible not only to take down counterfeit products offered on its website 
after having received notice but also to identify trademark infringements 
through a precautionary filtering process and by requiring authenticity 
certifications of sellers using its auction site.  In this respect, however, the 
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French rulings are consistent with a decision handed down in 2000 by the 
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris against Yahoo! Inc. (Yahoo!), under 
which the host provider Yahoo! was ordered to do everything technically 
and technologically possible to prevent access by French Internet users to 
websites on which Nazi memorabilia could be bought at auction.354  The 
ruling also drew great international attention, and is still regarded as a 
textbook example of the different values in American and French case 
law.355 
3.  The High Court of England and Wales Decision and the ECJ’s Opinion 
As in the French case L’Oréal v. eBay, in the High Court of England 
and Wales case of L’Oréal SA v. eBay International AG,356 L’Oréal argued 
that eBay should be liable for the sale of counterfeit goods and parallel 
imports goods on its website.  In a preliminary ruling, the High Court held 
that eBay was not jointly liable for the sale of counterfeit L’Oréal products 
on its website.357  However, the High Court was also of the opinion that EU 
trademark law and the EU E-Commerce Directive were unclear as to 
several issues raised by the case, and referred those issues to the ECJ for 
further guidance.358 
The ECJ subsequently ruled that the exemption from liability found in 
Article 14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive applies where an online 
marketplace operator has not played an “active role” that would provide it 
with knowledge or control over the data that it hosts.359  According to the 
court, an operator plays an active role, and thereby loses the protection of 
the exemption, when it provides additional assistance, such as optimizing 
the presentation of offers for sale or promoting them.360  It will be for the 
High Court to determine whether the particular acts undertaken by eBay 
constituted an “active role” disqualifying it from the Article 14 exemption.  
ECJ further stated that, even if an operator has not played an “active role” 
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by providing such assistance, it will nevertheless be liable if it was aware of 
facts or circumstances that should lead a diligent business operator to 
realize that the acts in question were unlawful, and failed to act 
expeditiously to prevent such acts.361 
It remains for the High Court to determine eBay’s liability, if any.  
However, the ECJ’s opinion will certainly be instructive in this and future 
cases.  If the operator of an online marketplace knew that particular 
infringing goods had been sold or offered for sale, due either to notice from 
others or to its own inspection, and knew that similar infringements by the 
same or other users were likely to continue, then, in general, this might 
constitute “actual knowledge” of the infringement and preclude immunity 
under the liability exemption of Article 14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive.  
Likewise, where the operator has provided promotional assistance to sellers, 
or assisted them in optimizing their offers for sale, the operator loses its 
immunity. 
On its face, the standard is generally in agreement with that spelled out 
in the Tiffany v. eBay decision.  Nevertheless, the precise interpretation of 
“actual knowledge” and the determination of whether an operator has 
undertaken an “active role” in its sellers’ activities is less clear and could be 
construed to include generalized knowledge of infringing activity as well as 
specific knowledge. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Counterfeiting results in direct losses to trademark owners, but it also 
leads to consumer confusion and deception.  Although sellers of luxury 
goods have been the traditional targets of counterfeiters, producers of 
entertainment media, food products, electronics, auto parts, and medicines 
face the problem as well.  The occurrence of counterfeiting and trademark 
infringement has accompanied the widespread use of online marketplaces.  
The recent U.S. decision in Tiffany v. eBay has provided an answer as to the 
secondary trademark infringement liability of operators of online markets, 
explaining that “[i]t is the trademark owner’s burden to police its mark, and 
companies like eBay cannot be held liable for trademark infringement based 
solely on their generalized knowledge that trademark infringement might be 
occurring on their websites.”362 
Conflicting approaches to the question of secondary trademark 
infringement liability of online markets among U.S. and European courts 
harm consumers who desire to purchase genuine goods, and undermine the 
businesses of luxury brand trademark owners and the development of the e-
commerce intermediaries.  Our analysis suggests that, ultimately, the issue 
comes down to “[w]ho should bear the burden of policing against the sale 
 
361 See id. 
362 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 527. 
The Liability of Online Markets for Counterfeit Goods 
32:37 (2011) 
89 
of counterfeits.”363  On this question, different national courts have arrived 
at conflicting answers, which makes it difficult for globally-operating 
online auction platforms like eBay to adapt their business models to the 
requirements of individual states.  Our analysis has shown that the 
contradictory decisions of different national courts are partly grounded in 
differences of underlying trademark or tort law, but also to a large degree 
seem to depend on conflicting views on the issue of who needs more legal 
protection, the trademark owner or the online market. 
This dilemma also represents a policy question, which to a large 
degree is linked to national economic interests.  Perhaps, therefore, it is not 
surprising that the French eBay decisions are more favourable to the luxury 
brand trademark holders.  French brands represent one-fourth of the global 
market for luxury goods—more than twice the market share of Italian 
brands and two and one-half times the market share of U.S. brands.364  
Sixty-eight out of 200 luxury brands in the world are French.365  E-
commerce sales of merchandise in the U.S. have grown exponentially and 
now represent almost half of all retail sales.366  By contrast, in Germany, 
neither of the two conflicting industries has a particular prevalence, which 
can explain the more neutral position reflected in the BGH decisions. 
All stakeholders would greatly benefit from a more uniform judicial 
assessment of online service providers’ secondary trademark infringement 
liability by different national courts, as such uniformity would lead to 
greater legal certainty.  In civil law countries, such as Germany and France, 
where the freedom of courts to create law is limited, the issue ultimately can 
only be resolved by the legislator.  In contrast, in common law systems, 
such as the U.S. and the U.K., a standard of secondary liability can be 
judicially fashioned, as indeed it was by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
Inwood case.367  It seems to us that the online market operator in Germany 
and France faces a real dilemma.  Online market operators in these 
countries are obligated to filter items listed on their websites, but if they 
filter too much, they will face lawsuits brought by their customers for 
breach of contract.368  Moreover, before removing any suspicious products, 
an online market operator needs to determine whether there is or is not 
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actually a direct trademark infringement.  This appears to be almost impos-
impossible in the case of auction websites like eBay, given the fact that the 
operator never has possession of the goods sold on its site. 
The issue of secondary trademark infringement liability of online 
markets is a perfect example of the general legal problem encountered in 
many Internet-related cases: on the Internet, it is difficult to limit a state 
power to only one territory, because the Internet is borderless and inherently 
international.  Internet users and service providers virtually pass state 
borders often without even being aware of the fact that they are doing so.  
They often do not realize that a foreign jurisdiction may govern their 
dealings, that foreign law may apply to their business transactions, and that 
ultimately a foreign court may judge their case.  Unlike traditional business 
transactions, which usually are governed by a specific national law, the e-
commerce merchant faces a multitude of sometimes conflicting national 
laws.  The accessibility of Internet service from almost anywhere often 
conveys unto foreign courts jurisdiction over cases they traditionally would 
not oversee.  Consequently, there is an obvious need for international 
harmonization of the law relating to secondary trademark infringement 
liability of online markets, or relating to civil liability of online service 
providers in general.  Our analysis of European law and examples of 
national European case law shows that, even where a unified legal 
framework, such as that provided by the EU Trade Marks Directive or the 
EU E-Commerce Directive, is available, international harmonization does 
not always prevent national courts from applying and interpreting the 
unified law in different ways according to the political or economic 
background of their home countries. 
Our analysis also reveals that the different outcomes in the eBay 
decisions, as rendered by different national courts, are partly grounded in 
considerable differences in the national trademark or tort law the decisions 
are based on.  The comparison of the French and German decisions shows 
that, even if a common understanding about the limitation on host provider 
liability could be reached (for example, following the French court of 
appeals’ application of the ECJ’s ruling in Google v. Louis Vuitton to find 
an online auctioneer not being exempt from secondary trademark liability), 
the fundamental differences in the underlying statutory trademark law, or 
statutory or common law of torts, will probably still lead to conflicting 
outcomes.  In order to establish secondary trademark infringement liability, 
the U.S., U.K. and German courts require some form of intent or specific 
knowledge, on the part of the online auctioneer, about direct trademark 
infringements by third parties.  In contrast, due to the considerably broader 
liability standard in French law, a French court probably would still 
acknowledge an online market’s liability when the other countries’ courts 
would deny it.  While countries could certainly agree on ways to harmonize 
specific issues related to Internet host provider liability, to us it seems 
unrealistic to expect them to unify issues so fundamental to national tort 
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liability, especially given the conflicting economic interests involved in the 
cases analyzed above.  It seems to us that, given these fundamental 
differences, online markets will continue to have to deal with different 
national laws and adapt their business models accordingly, as the different 
versions of national eBay websites illustrate. 
Conflicting standards of secondary liability will only ensure a 
seemingly never-ending series of litigation before different national courts.  
Such lawsuits may have some merit in generating publicity for the luxury 
brands involved, but the lawsuits do not contribute to finding a remedy to 
the problem of online counterfeiting.  An online market operator which 
suspects that counterfeiting is occurring should take reasonable precautions 
to remedy the problem.  If the online marketplace model is to remain viable, 
however, the most effective approach to combat trademark counterfeiting, 
as some of the eBay decisions suggest, would be collaboration between the 
trademark holders and online service providers, rather than a standard 
predicated on the strict liability of the market operator. 
A trademark “notice and takedown” approach, combined with an anti-
fraud filtering search engine, such as that employed by eBay and sanctioned 
by the court in the Tiffany v. eBay case, may prove to be the practical 
answer to intermediary market liability in the long run.  At a minimum, 
such a procedure should require that the trademark owner act on a good 
faith belief in submitting a notice that counterfeit or trademark infringing 
goods have been offered for sale by a user of the online market.  After 
receiving such notice, the online market operator would immediately locate 
and remove the alleged counterfeit merchandise.  Should the user dispute 
the trademark owner’s allegation, the online market operator could refer the 
parties to expedited arbitration or a similar alternate dispute resolution 
process, such as mediation, as the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris 
suggested in L’Oréal v. eBay. 
We believe that such a safe harbor approach would offer a strong 
incentive for the operators of online markets to implement notice and 
takedown procedures similar to that used by eBay.  The procedure would be 
consonant with that commonly applied in copyright cases under the DMCA 
in the U.S., as well as the EU’s E-Commerce Directive.  Without such a 
consensus, eBay and other online merchants will have to police their sites 
differently in different countries.  A standard of secondary liability based on 
specific knowledge, as we have recommended, and which the U.S., 
German, and U.K. courts have essentially already adopted, places the onus 
of policing trademarks on the trademark owners rather than on the online 
market operator.  Trademark owners know their goods best of all.  In the 
end, they are best suited to most efficiently authenticate their goods and 
identify counterfeits, much more so than intermediary market operators.  
Moreover, such a standard will not discourage the operation of legitimate 
online marketplaces. 
 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 32:37 (2011) 
92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
